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LONG-TERM LIABILITY FOR
HAZARDOUS WASTE INDUCED
INJURY IN MISSOURI: LATENT
HARM SUFFERERS BEWARE
THOMAS J. MAR TIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Many benefits and comforts are attributable to our present advanced
technology. Yet, in addition to enjoying these benefits and comforts,
our society also must assess and account for the harm that this technol-
ogy causes. In recent years, technological change has created great
risks to human health and to the environment.1 Toxic substances pol-
lution2 is one product of this technological change.
* B.S., University of Illinois, 1981; J.D., Washington University, 1985.
1. See generally S. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF CANCER (1978) (concluding that the
prevention of cancer requires a concerted national effort to control human exposure to
toxic chemicals); THE SILENT BOMB (P. Faulkner ed. 1977) (outlining risks of nuclear
power); Toxic SUBSTANCES STRATEGY COMM., Toxic CHEMICALS AND PUBLIC PRO-
TECTION, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 1-10 (1980) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC PRO-
TECTION] (discussing sources and health effects of toxic substances).
2. The Missouri Hazardous Waste Management Law defines hazardous waste as:
[A]ny waste or combination of wastes which ... because of its quantity, concen-
tration, or physical, chemical or infectious characteristics may cause or signifi-
cantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible,
or incapacitating reversible, illness, or pose a present or potential threat to the
health of humans or the environment.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 260.360(8) (1978 & Supp. 1983). The Missouri Hazardous Waste
Commission, the state hazardous waste regulatory body, classifies materials as "hazard-
ous" using the following criteria: "toxicity, persistence, degradability [in nature], po-
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Every day industries release toxic chemicals and hazardous wastes
into the environment that will remain dangerous for decades or even
centuries.3 As a result, much of the nation's drinking water, food, and
air contain an assortment of potentially harmful chemicals.4 Human
contact with these chemicals is virtually inescapable' and creates an
accelerating health risk to society.6 For example, studies have linked
tential for accumulation in tissue [and other related factors such as] flammability,
corrosiveness, and other hazardous characteristics." Mo. REV. STAT. § 260.370(l)(a)
(1978 & Supp. 1983). Toxic substances come in many forms: solids, powders, liquids,
sludges, and gases. "Hazardous waste" is an umbrella term encompassing high-level or
low-level radioactive material, components in solid waste, hazardous wastes, hazardous
substances, polluted air and water, de-icing salts, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs),
aflatoxin and other toxins, and oil spills. The term also includes toxic substances found
in building materials (for example, asbestos), leachate from landfills and pesticides.
SPEER'S DIGEST OF Toxic SUBSTANCES STATE LAW: 1983-84 TRENDS, SUMMARIES
AND FORECASTS 8 (R. Speer & G. Bulanowski ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as SPEER'S
DIGEST].
3. Milhollin, Long-Term Liability for Environmental Harm, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 1,
1 (1979). Presently 60,000 different chemicals are produced in the United States and
the figure is growing at a rapid pace. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVI-
RONMENTAL QUALITY 8 (1983). Ten to twenty percent of these chemicals present an
environmental threat. IA F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 4A-77
(1982). Industry generated 56,000,000 metric tons of waste nationwide in 1980. 45
Fed. Reg. 33,072 (1980). According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
90% of all wastes are disposed of improperly-in unsecured landfills, by improper in-
cineration, or by midnight dumping. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVI-
RONMENTAL QUALITY 218 (1980). Hazardous waste generation is increasing at a rate
of 3% a year. Hazardous Waste Fact Sheet, EPA JOURNAL, Feb. 1979, at 12.
4. PUBLIC PROTECTION, supra note 1, at 1-10.
5. "Human exposure to toxic substances may occur through air, water, and terres-
trial pollution; through pesticides, foods and food additives, drugs, cosmetics, consumer
products, workplace conditions, waste disposal and accidents." Id. at xiii.
6. In 1980, the Department of Health and Human Services concluded its report on
the threat to public health caused by toxic chemicals as follows:
In summary, we believe that toxic chemicals are adding to the disease burden of
the United States in a significant, although as yet precisely undefined, way. In
addition, we believe that this problem will become more important in the years
ahead. It is our hope and belief that full implementation of recent environmental
control legislation will sharply reduce marketing of toxic chemicals and conse-
quently reduce the exposure of our people to such chemicals. However, through
this decade we believe we will confront a series of environmental emergencies. We
believe that the magnitude of the public health risk associated with toxic chemicals
currently is increasing and will continue to do so until we are successful in identify-
ing chemicals which are highly toxic and controlling the introduction of these
chemicals into our environment.
ASSESSMENT OF THE THREAT TO PUBLIC HEALTH POSED BY TOXIC CHEMICALS IN
THE UNITED STATES: A REPORT FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, reprinted in COMM. ON ENVTL. AND PUB.
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latent chronic diseases such as cancer, respiratory ailments, and neuro-
logical impairments to several toxicants pervasive in the environment. 7
Despite this clear and growing threat to the nation's health, most
courts and legislatures have not developed a fair and effective personal
injury cause of action for persons harmed by exposure to hazardous
substances pollution.'
This Note begins with a summary of the sources and potential health
effects of hazardous substances pollution, concentrating primarily on
dioxin contamination in Missouri. Part II analyzes the obstacles to
recovering damages for toxic pollution related injuries. This section
discusses party-related problems, statutes of limitation, and proof of
causation. Parts III and IV explore Missouri's common law and statu-
tory avenues of redress for personal injury caused by exposure to haz-
ardous substances. Specifically, these sections focus on long-term
liability for latent injuries caused by "toxic torts." These sections ana-
lyze the formidable barriers to recovery at common law and the limited
protection the Missouri Hazardous Waste Management Law9 affords
those harmed by toxic waste pollution. Finally, Part V advocates the
WORKS, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. HEALTH EFFECTS OF ToxIc POLLUTION: A REPORT
FROM THE SURGEON GEN. 8 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as SURGEON GEN-
ERAL'S REPORT].
7 PUBLIC PROTECTION, supra note 1, at 7-10. Manifestations of latent injury gen-
erally do not develop until 20 or more years after the initial exposure. In a study of 725
asbestos insulation workers, persons that initially had been exposed less than 20 years
before the study had normal x-rays. After 20 years had passed from the onset of expo-
sure, most had abnormal x-rays. United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11,
40 (D. Minn. 1974) (study conducted by Dr. Irving Selikoff, one of the world's foremost
experts on the health effects of asbestos fibers).
8. See generally Milhollin, supra note 3 (common law inadequate in compensating
those harmed by toxic torts); SPEER'S DIGEST, supra note 2, at 23 (no state laws enacted
relating to non-occupational chemical injury claims in 1983); Note, Compensating Haz-
ardous Waste Victims: RCRA Insurance Regulations and a Not so "Super" Fund Act, 11
ENVTL. L. 689 (1981) (federal law inadequate in compensating those injured by toxic
waste pollution).
Admittedly, many victims of toxic substances pollution will have health insurance,
either privately secured or provided as part of an employment plan. This coverage may
be adequate to provide for the victim's needs. Latent injuries and diseases often are
quite serious, however, and coverage in these cases may be insufficient to provide care
for the victim. For instance, if there is a large earnings loss, it is unlikely that those
injured will have substantial disability insurance. Additionally, such policies rarely pro-
vide full reimbursement. Employer disability plans also are limited in coverage and
governmental sources of compensation for such harms are virtually non-existent. Gins-
berg & Weiss, Common Law Liability for Toxic Torts: A Phantom Remedy, 9 HoFSTRA
L. REV. 859, 863 n.15 (1981).
9. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 260.350-.609 (1978 & Supp. 1983).
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adoption of a state toxic tort statutory cause of action for hazardous
waste pollution-induced personal injuries. 1"
II. THE HAZARDOUS WASTE PROBLEM IN MISSOURI
Today, over four hundred sites state-wide are suspected of contain-
ing hazardous wastes.11 High levels12 of the toxic chemical dioxin13
exist in thirty-eight sites, the largest state-wide number of dioxin con-
taminated sites in the nation.
14
The dioxin problem in Missouri is not new. State officials first dis-
covered the highly toxic substance in Moscow Mills, Missouri, in
1971.15 Until recently, however, the full extent of the contamination
remained unknown. In 1983, national attention focused on the small
town of Times Beach, Missouri, where extremely high levels of dioxin
10. Trauberman, Statutory Reform of Toxic Torts: Relieving Legal, Scientific, and
Economic Burdens on the Chemical Victim, 7 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 177 (1983). A
proposed hazardous waste model statute is included in the Trauberman article. See id.
at 250-96. This Note incorporates into its proposal some of the provisions appearing in
this model statute.
11. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 6, 1984, at 13A, col. 2. Extremely high levels of
dioxin contaminate as many as 50 sites in Missouri. SENATE COMM. ON ENVT. AND
PUB. WORKS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT: INJURIES AND DAMAGES FROM HAZ-
ARDOUS WASTES-ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES PART II 3
(Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter cited as INJURIES AND DAMAGES II].
12. Dioxin levels in Missouri are "so high as to alarm anyone with the most rudi-
mentary acquaintance with modem technology." PCB and Dioxin Cases: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigation of the House Comm. of Energy and
Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1982) (testimony of Dr. Ellen Silbergeld) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Silbergeld's Testimony].
13. Tetracholorodibenzodioxin (TCDD) is dioxin's full chemical name. Yan-
nacone, Kavenagh & Searcy, Dioxin: Molecule of Death, 17 TRIAL 30, 32 (Dec. 1981)
[hereinafter cited as Yannacone].
14. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Aug. 6, 1984, at 1A, col. 3.
15. In 1971, Russell Bliss, a waste hauler, sprayed 2,000 gallons of waste oil con-
taminated with dioxin as a dust suppressant on a horse arena's soil at Shenandoah Sta-
bles. Acute medical symptoms appeared in humans and animals within a few days. In
the ensuing year, 197 horses, dogs, and cats became ill and many died. The stable
owner's six year old daughter became ill and was hospitalized on August 22, 1971.
Subsequently, the stable owners sued the waste oil company for damages. The parties
settled and the plaintiffs collected $226,500 for damages to their property, medical
costs, and exemplary damages for the gross negligence and willful and wanton miscon-
duct of the polluters. SENATE COMM. ON ENVT. AND PUB. WORKS, 96TH CONG., 2D
SESS., SIX CASE STUDIES OF COMPENSATION FOR Toxic SUBSTANCES POLLUTION:
ALABAMA, CALIFORNIA, MICHIGAN, MISSOURI, NEW JERSEY, AND TEXAS 35-36
(Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as SIX CASES].
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were found.1 6 Since then, state and federal officials have discovered
numerous other dioxin sites, and more discoveries are likely to follow.
A. Source of the Problem
Although other hazardous substances threaten persons in Missouri,
dioxin contamination represents the state's most pervasive toxic waste
problem. Dioxin is an unwanted by-product of the manufacture of cer-
tain cleansers and herbicides, including Agent Orange, a defoliant used
in the Vietnam War. 7 In the 1960s and 1970s, approximately thirty
companies in Missouri manufactured dioxin-related chemicals. During
this time, a small number of these manufacturers disposed of these sub-
stances improperly and, thus, created the toxics problem Missouri
faces today.' 8
B. Health Effects
Dioxin is one of the most toxic of all man-made chemicals,' 9 yet its
long-term health effects remain unclear. Although acute effects from
exposure to dioxin can be quite severe,20 researchers have not yet fully
16. The streets of Times Beach were sprayed with dioxin-contaminated waste oil in
the early 1970s. The federal government, beginning in 1983, began to buy out the town
for $36.7 million because of fears of the health hazard to its residents. St. Louis Post-
Dispatch, Aug. 6, 1984, at 1, col. 3.
17. Veterans exposed to Agent Orange during the Vietnam War recently settled out
of court for $180 million in their class action damages suit against the principal wartime
manufacturers of the herbicide.
18. Riverfront Times, Jan. 18-24, 1984, at 6, col. 1 (Comments of Fred Lasfer, Di-
rector of the Missouri Department of Natural Resources).
19. Ellen Silbergeld, an environmentalist, recently testified that "the acute and
chronic toxicity of dioxin has been reviewed in several recent documents prepared by
EPA. In all these documents, the potent toxicity of dioxin, as an acutely lethal agent
and as one of the most potent carcinogens yet studied, is recognized and described."
Silbergeld's Testimony, supra note 12, at 25. For a brief history of dioxin and an analy-
sis of its toxicity, see Yannacone, supra note 13.
20. Acute effects of exposure to dioxin have been observed in a series of sudden
occupational exposures since 1949. Normally, the symptoms resulting from an acute
exposure begin with a burning sensation in the eyes, nose, and throat followed by head-
ache, dizziness, nausea, and vomiting accompanied in some cases by abdominal pain
and diarrhea. After exposure the onset of chloracne has been observed. Chloracne is
characterized by inflamed nodules and pustules on the face, forearms, shoulders, neck,
trunk, feet, and legs, accompanied by blackheads and cysts. The chloracne is generally,
but not invariably, associated with a wide range of other symptoms of multi-system
disease such as abnormalities in liver function and peripheral neuropathy. Yannacone,
supra note 13, at 36-37. Emotional problems, including depression, anxiety, marked
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documented its long-term consequences.2 1 Some studies, however,
provide "suggestive" evidence of increased incidents of stomach can-
cer, lung cancer, and soft tissue glaucomas in those occupationally ex-
posed to dioxin.22 Moreover, a recent Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) study of Missourians exposed to dioxin suggests that
high level dioxin exposure may weaken the body's immune system.23
This uncertainty surrounding the health effects of dioxin recently led
an EPA pharmacologist to testify that there is no "safe" level of dioxin
in the environment.24
III. OBSTACLES TO RECOVERY IN MISSOURI FOR LATENT HARM
CAUSED BY HAZARDOUS WASTE POLLUTION
Persons that are exposed to a toxic substance such as dioxin and seek
redress for resulting latent harm must contend with a variety of obsta-
cles and sometimes absolute barriers to recovery. Such impediments to
recovery are: a) Discovering the proper parties to an action; b) filing a
timely claim; c) proving causation; and d) finding a viable theory to
invoke to hold a particular defendant liable.
A. Parties
1. Defendants
a. The Judgment-Proof Defendant
In a personal injury case, a plaintiff needs to join all solvent defend-
ants.25 A plaintiff whose harm develops twenty years after an exposure
to a toxic substance, however, faces special difficulties. The toxic waste
personality change, difficulties with concentration and memory, and other neuro-psy-
chiatric syndromes, also have been linked to dioxin exposure. Id. at 37.
21. Research on the long-term effects of dioxin is in its infant stages. The duration
and follow-up of such testing has been too short to document fully the long-term effects
of human exposure to dioxin. Id. at 37.
No absolute connection between cancer and those occupationally exposed to TCDD
has been established. Studies are inconclusive, however, because the duration of the
follow-up is too short. rd.
22. Id. at 37. One scientist speculated that dioxin could be behind the rise in subur-
ban cancer rates, stating, "Now as we look among the people who live along heavily
defoliated rights-of-way, and near highways with active chemical weed control pro-
grams, we are beginning to see the same panoply of multi-system disease that character-
izes so many of the Vietnam combat veterans." Id.
23. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 31, 1984, at 1A, col. 4.
24. N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1984, at A18, col. 1 (statement of Dr. D. Diane Courtney).
25. Potential defendants in a hazardous waste injury case are:
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol28/iss1/8
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generators, transporters, or disposers potentially liable for the injury
may be bankrupt or dissolved,26 especially if the company in question
previously lost or settled a toxic injury lawsuit. Thus, victims of toxics
pollution may encounter judgment-proof defendants.
(i) the person who did a wrongful act, i.e., the dumper or disposer of waste, the
person who by his wrongful or negligent act created the risk;
(ii) the person who, regardless of the wrongful or negligent disposal, now owns
or leases the land on which a hazardous condition exists; or
(iii) the class or category of persons who may be regarded as collectively responsi-
ble for the creation of the hazard to the extent of each member's "market
share" or against an entire class of enterprises, industry wide. (citation
omitted).
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
301(e) REPORT: INJURIES AND DAMAGES FROM HAZARDOUS WASTES-ANALYSIS
AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES PART 146 (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter
cited as INJURIES AND DAMAGES I].
26. Generally, dissolved corporations are judgment-proof. The company that pro-
duced the dioxin found at most of Missouri's dioxin contaminated sites, Northeastern
Pharmaceutical and Chemical Company (NEPACCO), disbanded in 1974. Recently,
however, a district judge ruled that NEPACCO and several of its former officers must
repay the government the funds it spent cleaning up a dioxin contaminated site in Mis-
souri. The judge required this repayment because the company failed to dissolve prop-
erly in 1974 and was still incorporated. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 31, 1984, at IA,
col. 5.
Large corporations often operate through subsidiaries. To limit liability these corpo-
rations can intentionally dissolve those subsidiaries if any wrongdoing is discovered.
For example, Life Science Products Company, a subcontractor of Allied Chemical, dis-
charged much of the pollution found in the James River. Shortly after the pollution
was discovered, Life Science declared bankruptcy. N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1976, at 1, col.
1. When latent harm arises many years after the defendant's act, the use of such corpo-
rate forms may bar recovery. See Milhollin, supra note 3, at 9. Generally, no liability
exists if the corporate defendant has been dissolved for a number of years and the liqui-
dation period has elapsed. H. HENN, CORPORATIONS 721, 814-15 (2d ed. 1970). The
same is generally true if the corporation has reorganized or has been sold by judicial
sale. 19 AM. JUR. 2d Corporations § 1556.(1965). If a subsidiary caused the injury, to
recover from the parent company, a claimant must show that the parent dominates the
subsidiary's affairs. To make such a showing, the plaintiff should establish the
following:
(1) the amount of subsidiary stock held by the parent;
(2) the presence in both corporations of the same officers;
(3) the amount of business conducted by the subsidiary with companies other
than the parent;
(4) the extent to which the parent uses the assets of the subsidiary as its own;
(5) the purpose for which the subsidiary was formed; and
(6) the adequacy of the subsidiary's capital structure.
N. LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS §§ 24-25 (2d ed. 1971). Clearly, a plaintiff
has a substantial burden of proof in this type of litigation. Thus, corporate counsel can
readily defeat meritorious claims by manipulating the corporate form.
19851
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The Missouri Hazardous Waste Management Law attempts to rem-
edy the problem of the judgment-proof defendant by requiring that
hazardous waste facilities27 and transporters28 be "financially responsi-
ble" and adequately insured.29 Liability insurance, however, inade-
quately protects claimants whose injuries become manifest decades
after the exposure. First, the responsible party may be insolvent and
no longer possess coverage.30 Additionally, assuming that toxic pollu-
tion insurance is available,31 no private insurer, trust fund, or surety
bond can protect sufficiently against the risk and magnitude of liability
27. Mo. REV. STAT. § 260.395.7(3) (1978 & Supp. 1983) provides:
7. Any person, before constructing, substantially altering or operating a hazard-
ous waste facility in this state shall file an application for a permit which shall:
... (3) Include, as specified by rules and regulations, demonstration of financial
responsibility including, but not limited to, guarantees, liability insurance, posting
of bond or any combination thereof, which shall be related to type and size of
facility....
Id.
28. Id. § 260.395.1(2) (provides for a substantially identical demonstration of finan-
cial responsibility when applying for a license to transport hazardous waste).
29. Transporters are required to be insured for $100,000 for injury or death per
person. 10 Mo. ADMIN. CODE § 25-6010 (1983). Financial responsibility requirements
aim to guarantee a claimant a realistic chance of recovery even if the responsible party
lacks the resources to compensate for the harm caused. This concern, however, goes
beyond the injured party. Clean-up expenses incurred by federal and state governmen-
tal agencies also are at stake. In a broader sense, financial responsibility requirements
help to assure compensation for these losses while preserving the financial health of the
polluting industry. Insurance reduces the economic burden on the polluting business by
spreading the costs among a large number of polluters over time. Pfenningstorf, Insur-
ance of Environmental Risks: Recent Developments, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SYMPO-
SIUM 1982 58-59 (1982) [hereinafter cited as SYMPOSIUM]. For recent surveys
regarding state liability insurance requirements, see Cohen & Derkins, Financial Re-
sponsibility for Hazardous Wastes Sites, 9 CAP. U.L. REV. 509, 526-44 (1980); Cohen,
New Developments in State Hazardous Waste Litigation, 9 CAP. U.L. REv. 489 (1980).
30. Milhollin, supra note 3, at 15.
31. Private insurance companies are reluctant to provide coverage for harm caused
by pollution for two reasons: 1) the lack of actuarial experience upon which to base
premiums; and 2) the fact that the harm involved is not sudden and, therefore, not
classifiable as an "accident." Id. Cf. SYMPOSIUM, supra note 29, at 69. Recently,
though, some insurers have started to offer "environmental impairment liability" cover-
age. This coverage applies to claims for releases or exposures that, while not intended
or expected by the insured, are continuous rather than sudden in nature. For details,
see AIDA Pollution Insurance Bulletin, vol. 1 nos. 1 and 2, and vol. 2 no. I (published
by the Working Party on Pollution and Insurance of the International Association for
Insurance Law). In addition, insurers recently have formed a special insurance pool
called the Pollution Liability Insurance Association, whose principal functions are to
pool engineering expertise, underwriting capacity, and loss experience of the participat-
ing insurers. See Friedman, Hazardous Waste Liability: EPA Ponders End to Third
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol28/iss1/8
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for latent harm-that is, harm, occurring after the site terminates oper-
ations.32 Like insurance against nuclear accidents, 33 the government
may have to subsidize toxic pollution insurance.3 4 Unfortunately,
Party Coverage (National Underwriter Property & Casualty Ins. Ed.) Oct. 9, 1981, at
4.79, cited in SYMPOSIUM, supra note 29, at 69.
32. SYMPOSIUM, supra note 29, at 67. Only the government can provide these long-
term guarantees for harms that may occur years after a facility closes. To this end, the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982), also known as the Superfund Act, established the Post-
Closure Liability Trust Fund in the Treasury of the United States. Id. § 9641. This
fund, which is comprised of a tax imposed on hazardous wastes received by disposal
facilities, assumes the liability that will otherwise fall on the facility's owner or operator
provided that the owner or operator has complied with the statute's requirements con-
cerning closure and post-closure care and there have been no hazardous waste dis-
charges for five years. SYMPOSIUM, supra note 29, at 67-68. Before this transfer of
liability can take place the owner or operator of the site presumably must maintain
existing insurance coverage. Id. at 67 n.9. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(k) (1982). This
scheme, however, leaves unsolved the problems posed by the thousands of orphaned
disposal sites abandoned before the Superfund Act or abandoned without complying
with the Act's guidelines. In addition, numerous sites are exempted from the regula-
tions because of the limited amount of materials handled by them. SYMPOSIUM, supra
note 29, at 67-68; see 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.5(a), 261.4 (1984).
The Post-Closure Liability Fund differs from the state superfund provision advocated
in this Note in one significant respect. Unlike the superfund provision proposed herein,
the Post-Closure Fund provides no subrogation provision against facilities that cause
latent harm. The availability of subrogation rights under the superfund will raise the
standard of care of those covered by the provision because of the threat of residual
liability. The Post-Closure Liability Fund omitted residual liability from its contours
because it was thought that residual liability would encourage companies to abandon
disposal sites or dissolve after closure to avoid financial responsibility. Note, supra note
8, at 704.
Despite its limitations, the Post-Closure Liability Fund does much to provide a
source of compensation for victims of pollution from closed facilities. As mentioned
above, this compensation is otherwise unavailable in the case when the defendant is
insolvent, absent, or judgment-proof.
33. Milhollin, supra note 3, at 15. Under the Price-Anderson Act, the federal gov-
ernment subsidizes nuclear accident insurance. See generally Meek, Nuclear Power and
the Price-Anderson Act: Promotion Over Public Protection, 30 STAN. L. REV. 393
(1978).
34. Milhollin, supra note 3, at 15. Under a consortium the State of Missouri would
subsidize hazardous waste accident insurance. One commentator hypothesized an in-
surance program that the state government underwrites entirely, as it does unemploy-
ment compensation:
Employers pay to the state premiums which are determined according to the risk
of the employment and the past performance of the employer. The state adminis-
ters all claims and payments. This device could be adapted to protect against long-
term harm if state legislatures would accept the risk. Premiums, accumulating
over long periods, could provide ample funds for claims and eventually decrease
the state's obligation.
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however, the analogous experience with nuclear accident insurance
reveals that coverage would be inadequate in amount.35 Consequently,
insurance provides little protection to individuals that develop latent
toxic pollution induced harm.
b. Apportioning Damages Among Defendants
To achieve full recovery against a single defendant at common law, a
claimant must prove that the defendant's conduct was a substantial
factor in causing the injury.3 6 When several polluters contribute to the
claimant's harm, the burden may be impossible to sustain.37 In such a
case, the problem of apportioning damages arises.
In tort, liability may be individual or joint and several, 38 a determi-
nation that often decides whether a claimant receives total,39 partial, 40
Id. This state-managed insurance plan would not, however, provide compensation for
persons harmed by an insolvent or bankrupt corporation. Insurance lapses when the
insured goes out of business. Moreover, as the commentator points out, states have
little experience in calculating premiums, especially in areas such as nuclear power and
hazardous pollution, which vary in the risks and hazards involved. Id. at 16. Thus, the
state would be tempted to limit premiums to a fixed amount. Unfortunately, this could
cause the industry to view the premium as a substitute for careful operations. Id. The
commentator concluded: "The difficulties of premium setting, liability limits, payment
procedures, and investment policy make it obvious that [a liability] fund. . . would be
superior to insurance." Id.
35. Id. at 15. See supra note 31. Like nuclear accident insurance, pollution insur-
ance for latent toxics-induced harm probably would be limited in amount if coverage
were available through a consortium. Id. In a case litigating the constitutionality of the
Price-Anderson Act, the parties stipulated that "homeowners cannot at any price buy
insurance to cover the nuclear risk. . . ." Appellee's Response to Jurisdictional State-
ments at 19, Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978),
cited in Milhollin, supra note 3, at 15 n.92. In Duke Power, the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the Act. 438 U.S. at 84, 93.
36. P. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 41, at 267 (5th ed. 1984).
37. INJURIES AND DAMAGES I, supra note 25, at 53. The substantial factor test
relieves parties from liability under a de minimis rationale, known in hazardous waste
cases as the "one drum exception." Rodberg, Apportionment of Damages in Hazardous
Waste Litigation, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, HAZARDOUS WASTE LITIGATION
183, 212 (Mott ed. 1981). The substantial factor test is retained in one of the personal
injury causes of action proposed herein. See infra notes 214-16 and accompanying text.
38. W. PROSSER, TORTS §§ 46-52 (4th ed. 1971).
39. See, e.g., Electrolytic Chlorine Co. v. Wallace & Turran Co., 328 Mo. 782, 791,
41 S.W.2d 1049, 1052 (1933) (each joint tortfeasor liable for whole damage).
40. See, eg., Sommerset Villa, Inc. v. City of Lee's Summit, 436 S.W.2d 658, 665
(Mo. 1968) (if damages are occasioned by independent acts, tortfeasor is only liable for
damages that his share occasions, and must be sued separately).
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or no compensation at all.41 This determination is based on the appli-
cability of joint liability theories and their burden shifting rules of ap-
portionment.42 In Missouri, joint liability commonly is applicable in
cases involving "concert of action ' 43 or cases in which the acts of sev-
eral tortfeasors cause a single indivisible injury.' Both types of joint
liability theories are potentially helpful to the toxic tort victim.
4
41. This bar arose in products liability cases involving DES (diethylstilbestrol) in-
duced cancer in daughters of women that took this drug. In these cases courts ruled
that the inability to prove that a specific manufacturer produced the DES that the
claimant's mother ingested must result in a summary judgment for the defendant. See,
e.g., Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1978); McCreery v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730 (1978); Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d
241 (Mo. 1984) (en banc); Namm v. Frosst, 178 N.J. Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121 (App.
Div. 1981). Contra Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163
Cal. Rptr. 132 (plaintiff's damages divided among the defendant companies in propor-
tion to each company's share of the DES market at the time of the sale, even though the
plaintiff could not prove that a specific manufacturer produced the drug that caused the
harm), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
42. Two widely accepted apportionment theories, concert of action and alternative
liability, exist in tort law. These theories allow a plaintiff to join multiple defendants
that in some way contributed to the plaintiff's harm. Two relatively new theories, mar-
ket share liability and enterprise liability, also are available. All of these theories shift
the burden of apportionment to the defendants if the plaintiff has a cause of action
against each of them. An in-depth analysis of the apportionment theories is beyond the
scope of this paper, although further discussion of the theory that best suits hazardous
waste pollution litigation appears in the proposal section of this note. See infra note 216
and accompanying text. In addition, principles of apportionment, insofar as they affect
the toxic tort victim, lose their significance when compensation is paid first out of a
personal injury fund such as the one advocated in this Note. Questions of joint and
several liability and apportionment then will arise only in the subrogation action in
which the fund seeks to replenish itself through action against the responsible parties.
INJURIES AND DAMAGES I, supra note 25, at 53. Thus, a personal injury fund shifts
apportionment problems away from the victims and onto the state, which has the better
resources of the two to collect from responsible parties.
43. See, e.g., Stafford v. Muster, 582 S.W.2d 670, 677 (Mo. 1979) (en bane) (joint
liability exists when the wrong is done by concert of action and common intent and
purpose if the act of each person is an efficient cause contributing to the injury).
44. See, e.g., Mails v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 51 F. Supp. 562, 564 (W.D. Mo.
1943) (a single indivisible injury such as death occasioned by the separate independent
acts of several tortfeasors lays the foundation for a joint action against the tortfeasors).
But cf Warner v. St. Louis & M.R.R. Co., 178 Mo. 125, 134, 77 S.W. 67, 70 (1903).
The Warner court stated:
If the injury may have resulted from one of two causes, for one of which, and not
the other, the defendant is liable, the plaintiff must show with reasonable certainty
that the cause for which the defendant is liable produced the result; and, if the
evidence leaves it to conjecture, the plaintiff must fail in his action.
Id.
45. Although concert of action and common intent are not present in most pollu-
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The difficult apportionment case involves theoretically divisible but
practically indivisible injury.46 Damages caused by several toxic dis-
charges are divisible at least theoretically because each party has dis-
charged a certain portion of the pollution that caused the injury.
Precise apportionment of the respective contributory responsibility of
each defendant, however, is often "practically" impossible.47 Accord-
ing to a report prepared for the Committee on Environment and Public
Works, Missouri courts would hold that a party suffering theoretically
divisible but practically indivisible injuries has the burden of allocating
contributory responsibility among the polluters.4a Several Missouri
stream polluters decisions support this conclusion.49 Presumably, this
result also will obtain in hazardous waste cases unless Missouri courts
adopt the apportionment concepts of market share liability or enter-
prise liability, a prospect that is unlikely.50 The enactment, as part of a
tion cases, they can be established when polluters knowingly engage in illegal disposal of
toxicants-commonly known as "midnight dumping." Regarding the applicability of
joint liability because of indivisible injury, one can argue that the injury is theoretically
indivisible because of synergistic reactions among the discharged toxicants. Such reac-
tions would make apportioning liability speculative. This argument, however, may
prove too much because it reveals a weak causal connection between the various dis-
charges and the harm.
46. See Six CAsEs, supra note 15, at 491.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 492.
49. See, e.g., Sommerset Villa, Inc. v. City of Lee's Summit, 436 S.W.2d 658, 665
(Mo. 1968) ("better to attempt some rough division than to hold one defendant for the
wound inflicted by another"); Benson v. City of St. Louis, 219 S.W. 575, 578 (Mo. 1920)
(the difficulty of measuring damages caused by the wrongful act of each contributor
does not make one liable for the acts of others); Marlinowsky v. City of Hannibal, 35
Mo. App. 70, 77 (1899) ("if several persons drain their premises in the same ditch, the
waters from which are discharged near the premises of another, and produce an injury
to his person or his comfortable enjoyment, each of the persons so using the drain is
liable, in separate actions for the damage occasioned to him") (emphasis in orginal).
50. These theories of apportionment, briefly explained at supra note 42, provide a
basis for finding joint liability in cases when the damages are divisible only theoretically;
i.e., when several defendants' actual contributory responsibility cannot be determined.
In Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1984), a DES case, the Missouri
Supreme Court, sitting en banc, rejected the application of both of these theories. The
court refused to apply industry-wide liability "because of the large number of drug man-
ufacturers involved, the lack of evidence of delegation of responsibility for safety stan-
dards to a trade association, and the pervasive role of the FDA in setting industry-wide
standards." Id. at 245. The court next issued a sweeping rejection of the market share
liability theory, calling it "unfair, unworkable, and contrary to Missouri law as well as
unsound public policy." Id. at 246. The court prefaced its analysis with the general
proposition that "Missouri law does not guarantee relief to every deserving plaintiff,"
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toxic tort victim's compensation scheme, of a statutory provision
adopting a specific theory of apportionment,5 1 can resolve this uncer-
tainly about apportionment.
2. Plaintiffs
Many persons harmed by hazardous waste pollution fail to seek re-
dress for their injuries. Informational deficiencies, the law's property-
related bias, and cost factors often determine whether an action is ever
instigated.
a. Informational Deficiencies
Public concern about the dangers of hazardous waste is growing.
5 2
Information concerning the nature and the effects of this problem,
however, is not widespread.5 3 The public is unaware of the serious
long-term health effects of exposure to hazardous wastes because the
research into these effects remains in its infancy. 54 The very nature of
latent injury also can suppress toxics claims. Injury of this type, often
invisible for twenty years or more, is far less likely to compel legal
action than torts that cause immediate and tangible injury or property
destruction.5"
b. Compensation Bias
American compensatory law has a built-in "property-related bias."
56
and further noted insufficient justification to compel "abandonment" of tort law's fun-
damental requirement that "a plaintiff prove, at a minimum, some nexus between
wrongdoing and injury." Id. at 246-47. The court found the market share theory ill-
defined and speculated that it would "discourage desired pharmaceutical research and
development while adding little incentive to production of safe products, for all compa-
nies face potential liability regardless of their efforts." Id. This refusal to adopt these
apportionment theories led to summary judgment for the defendant DES producers.
51. See infra note 216 for the proposed statutory approach.
52. In a recent survey, 64% of those polled expressed "a great deal" of concern
about hazardous waste disposal and 46% expressed "a great deal" of concern over toxic
chemicals such as PCBs or pesticides in the environment. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMEN-
TAL QUALITY, Public Opinion on Environmental Issues; Results of a National Public
Opinion Survey 28 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Public Opinion].
53. SIX CASES, supra note 15, at 496. In a 1980 survey, 65% of the people ques-
tioned were unaware of what had happened at Love Canal. Public Opinion, supra note
52, at 37.
54. SIX CASES, supra note 15, at 496.
55. Id. at 497.
56. Id. at 493. The Weiss Lake and Coosa River PCB contamination incident in
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This bias appears in Missouri law both in its specific requisites for re-
covery in tort 57 and, in a broader sense, in its application of certain tort
categories to certain types of harm.
In Missouri, recovery in nuisance and trespass is predicated on a
claimant's ownership of land, 8 while both property owners and non-
property owners can recover in strict liability.59 Property owners,
therefore, are favored with the extra protection that nuisance and tres-
pass law can provide. In addition, in cases involving personal injury
damages for pollution-caused harm, Missouri courts apply nuisance
and trespass law to the virtual exclusion of the strict liability cause of
action.6° As a result, land owners also have a better chance to recover
for personal injury caused by toxic pollutants. This is unfortunate be-
cause toxics-related harm sometimes is unconnected to property
ownership.
The property-related bias also is apparent in the Missouri Hazardous
Waste Management Law. The law's "Superfund" 61 currently does not
provide money to redress toxics-induced personal injury. Rather, its
sole purpose is to pay for property damages and property-related clean-
up activities.62
c. Cost
Finally, the enormous cost associated with bringing a toxic tort ac-
Alabama provides an example of this bias. Plaintiffs that owned property along the
polluted water obtained compensation. Other plaintiffs that depended on the use of the
river for their livelihood, but did not own waterfront property, did not obtain compen-
sation. Id. at 59-87.
57. See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. As a general matter this holds
true in most jurisdictions. See supra note 56 and infra notes 58-60 and accompanying
text. For example, in Virginia property damage claims have a longer statute of limita-
tions period than personal injury claims. Six CASES, supra note 15, at 493.
58. See infra notes 101 & 117 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 173-84 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
61. Mo. REv. STAT. § 260.480 (1978 & Supp. 1983) (establishes the "Hazardous
Waste Remedial Fund").
62. Id. Section 260.480.2(6) states that the fund shall be used for: "financing the
nonfederal share of the cost of cleanup and site remediation activities. . . ." Id. Addi-
tionally, § 260.420(3) provides that the State Hazardous Waste Commission can acquire
"by purchase, donation, agreement, or condemnation any lands, or rights in lands, sites,
objects, or facilities necessary to protect the health of humans and the environ-
ment. . . ." Id.
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tion often precludes relatively small claims.6 3 The expert witnesses,
scientific evidence exhibits, and etiological research needed to prove a
claim against a toxic tortfeasor all are quite costly. Consequently, the
joinder of small claims often is crucial to the viability of modest toxic
tort actions." If joinder is unattainable, an out-of-court settlement,
usually for a comparatively small amount,6 is the best a claimant can
hope for.
B. Statute of Limitations Problems
The tolling of the applicable statute of limitations can prevent recov-
ery under both statutory and common law. In Missouri, the limita-
tions period commences on the date the injury is capable of
ascertainment.66 After the injury is discoverable, the statute of limita-
tions for a tort action is five years.6 7
Although Missouri has a more lenient statute of limitations than
63. Most of this cost is incurred in attempting to prove the complicated issue of
causation. See infra notes 73-92 and accompanying text.
64. Under federal law, a plaintiff can invoke procedural devices for voluntary join-
der of parties, as under FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a):
All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief
jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the same trans-
action, or occurrence . . .and if any question of law or fact common to all these
persons will arise in the action. ...
Id. A plaintiff also can transfer and consolidate actions for joint trial of issues involving
common questions of law or fact. This procedure was followed in In re Northern Dist.
of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Products Liab. Litig., 521 F. Supp. 1188, 1194 (N.D. Cal.
1981). See also INJURIES AND DAMAGES I, supra note 25, at 68. In Missouri, Mo.
REV. STAT. § 507.040 (1978 & Supp. 1983), provides for permissive joinder of parties.
It is virtually identical to FED. R. Civ. P. 20.
65. The obstacles inherent in any lawsuit, such as the uncertainty of success, costs,
and delays, paired with the defendant's superior information and fact finding ability in
this type of action, create unfair bargaining power for a defendant in settlement negotia-
tions. Consequently, plaintiffs achieve small settlements.
66. At least 39 states have adopted this type of rule. INJURIES AND DAMAGES I,
supra note 25, at 43. Missouri's statute of limitations for civil actions is determined by
statute: "the cause of action shall not be deemed to accrue when the wrong is done or
the technical breach of contract or duty occurs, but when the damage resulting there-
from is sustained and is capable of ascertainment." Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.100 (1978 &
Supp. 1983); Cf. Krug v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 143, 149-50 (Mo. 1963) (ac-
tion filed in 1963 to recover from drug manufacturers for damage allegedly caused to
eyes from use of drug first used by claimant in 1953, not barred by statute of limitations,
as hazardous side effects of drug were first described in medical journals in 1957 and the
user was unaware of eye condition and its cause until 1961).
67. Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.120 (1978 & Supp. 1983).
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many other states, 68 the nature of latent injury69 nevertheless can cause
statute of limitations problems. For instance, when latent harm results
from an exposure to a toxic chemical, minor symptoms of injury often
go unnoticed. Thus, it is possible that a Missouri court will rule that
an injury is "capable of ascertainment" before the plaintiff actually dis-
covers the harm.7° Moreover, even if the injury is discovered in time, a
plaintiff must ascertain the cause of the injury before the statute tolls. 7I
Thus, even Missouri's relatively lenient statute of limitations may de-
feat meritoriously latent injury claims.72
68. A few jurisdictions still reject what has now become known as the "discovery
rule." The trend is to adopt this type of statute of limitations. In 1982, five states-
Idaho, New York, South Dakota, Virginia, and Wisconsin-and the Virgin Islands had
statutes of limitations that run from the time that the wrong or the breach occurred.
INJURIES AND DAMAGES I, supra note 25, at 45.
In hazardous waste litigation, a cause of action in those five states and the Virgin
Islands accrues at the time of the exposure. Exposure to certain hazardous wastes may
cause cancer or other types of injuries that have long latency periods, sometimes 20
years or more. Thus, a limitations period that begins to run at the time of exposure will
toll before the injured party could possibly become aware of his injury. Id. at 43.
69. See supra note 7.
70. See Six CASES, supra note 15, at 319-20.
71. This result will occur when the injured party is unaware of or forgets about the
harmful exposure. Additionally, if the claimant is aware of the exposure, but fails to
connect it to the harm, the statute of limitations may toll before the party makes the
connection. INJURIES AND DAMAGES I, supra note 25, at 43. Thirteen states prevent
this result by adopting a statute of limitations that begins to run at the time the injured
party ascertains or should ascertain a casual connection between the injury and the
harmful exposure. At least one federal court has adopted such a rule. See Insurance
Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, 451 F. Supp. 1230, 1240 (E.D. Mich. 1978)
(only when disease manifests itself, implicating a causal relationship to the manufac-
tured product, does the statute of limitations begin to run).
Some states' limitation periods begin when the plaintiff actually discovers the particu-
lar disease or injury. Some states provide a special statute of limitations period for
injuries that result from faulty products and exposure to toxic wastes. Generally these
statutes provide for a longer limitation period. These lenient statute of limitations pro-
visions reflect the uncertain state of medical and scientific expertise regarding environ-
mental toxicology. See Note, Hazardous Waste Liability and Compensation: Old
Solutions, New Solutions, No Solutions, 14 CONN. L. REV. 307, 321 (1982).
72. An example of how the Missouri statute of limitations can bar meritorious
claims is instructive. Mr. and Mrs. X lived at Bad Times Beach before the discovery of
hazardous wastes there. They moved to Florida and failed to receive news of the Bad
Times Beach contamination. Twenty years later, Mr. X developed the same type of
cancer that a highly disproportionate number of Bad Times Beach residents developed.
Bereft of information concerning dioxin and its effects on the other residents of the ill-
fated town, Mr. X, who is busy recovering from extensive treatment, fails to link his
disease to its cause, the exposure in Bad Times Beach, until five years pass. Thus, he
loses his cause of action.
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C. Causation
The most substantial obstacle to recovery for hazardous waste in-
duced injuries is proving causation7 3-tracing a direct relationship be-
tween the defendant's acts and the plaintiffs injury.74 Regardless of
the cause of action pursued-whether it is negligence, nuisance, tres-
pass, or strict liability-the injured party must prove causation.75
In toxic tort cases, proof of causation involves several theoretical and
practical difficulties that often defeat recovery. Missouri courts often
are reluctant to allow recovery for latent harm76 and rarely allow re-
covery based upon the possibility of future personal harm.77 Difficul-
ties in establishing causation often are responsible for these results. To
show causation, the plaintiff must identify the chemical causing the
harm,7" trace the substance from its source to the victim,79 and legally
73. Causation is the "paramount" legal issue in hazardous waste litigation. Soble, A
Proposal for the Administrative Compensation of Victims of Toxic Substance Pollution: A
Model Act, 14 HARV. J. ON LEois. 683, 706 (1977). See also Six CASES, supra note 15,
at 488 ("Clearly, the most difficult feature of any [hazardous waste personal injury case]
would be proof of the causal connection between the defendant's wrongful acts and the
injuries of which the plaintiffs complained."). See generally Comment, Judicial Atti-
tudes Towards Legal and Scientific Proof of Cancer Causation, 3 COLUM. J. ENVrL. L.
344 (1977).
74. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 430-53 (1965); P. KEETON, supra
note 36, § 41.
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430 (1976) (causation must be proved in
strict liability).
76. See, e.g., Elgin v. United States, 89 F. Supp. 195, 197 (W.D. Mo. 1950) (revers-
ing judgment for plaintiff for failure to prove by preponderance of the evidence that
injuries suffered caused resulting cancer); Berardino v. General Molding, Inc., 586
S.W.2d 365, 366 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (workman's compensation for alleged asbestos
induced lung ailment denied because of testimony of employer's medical experts that an
employee suffered from a lung condition caused by excessive smoking and from testi-
mony of the company president that asbestos had not been used by the employer). But
see Smith v. Cook Paint & Varnish, 561 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (an
accident need not be the sole or direct cause of industrial injury to be compensable, as
long as it is a concurring or contributory cause; a particular disability does not have to
be directly traceable to a specific event).
77. See, e.g., Laswell v. Brown, 524 F. Supp. 847, 850 (W.D. Mo. 1981) (lawsuit for
personal injury cannot be based upon the possibility of some future harm); Coffer v.
Paris, 550 S.W.2d 915, 918 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (insufficient for the doctor to testify
concerning the possibility of a certain result; his testimony should show that a specified
result is reasonably certain to follow the plaintiff's injury); Hahn v. McDowell, 349
S.W.2d 479, 482 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961) (testimony of physicians that in their opinion the
possibility of cancer developing at site of burn scar was incompetent and speculative).
78. Several obstacles makes this task difficult. One difficulty is synergism, or the
interaction between two pollutants. Often chemicals in combination cause injury.
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establish that the chemical caused the injury or disease.8°
In Missouri, plaintiffs must establish the causal connection by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. 81 Proof of causation in toxic tort cases is
complex, necessitating expert testimony 82 in several disciplines. Sup-
porting scientific data, including the results of epidemiological studies,
also may be required. In addition to problems and uncertainties inher-
Showing that combinations of chemicals cause the harm requires highly sophisticated,
time consuming, and costly scientific analysis. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT,
supra note 6, at 133-38. Another complication arises in latent injury cases. The identity
of a toxic substance may chemically and physically change during the time the latent
injury was dormant. Thus, establishing the original composition of the substance may
be a difficult task. Id.
79. This task becomes difficult when more than one source has contributed to the
contamination. Id. at 5-6. For example, ground water contamination, especially in
industrial areas, often can be attributed to several causes. The substance's path en route
to a victim is subject to such factors as time, space, and rate of movement. Note, supra
note 71, at 322 n.85.
Some of the more mobile persistent pollutants (i.e., those that have high water
solubility, high vapor pressure, etc.) may be transported over a considerable por-
tion of the globe by natural geochemical processes and by movement through food
chains. Accordingly, pathways between sources and potential targets may be long
and complex and exposure levels of any particular location may reflect contribu-
tions from numerous widely dispersed sources.
SURGEON'S GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 6, at 156, quoting SUBCOMM. ON SCIENCE,
RESEARCH, AND TECHNOLOGY OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOL-
OGY, 96TH CONG., lST SESS., AN OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH IN BIOGEOCHEMISTRY
AND ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH (1979).
80. A determination that a certain substance legally caused a certain disease is ob-
scured by complications in the evolution of experimental data, the uncertain relevance
of low-level exposure evaluations and results of animal testing to humans, and the com-
plex nature of scientific statistical reports. See Note, supra note 8, at 714. The physical
response that contaminants may evoke after human ingestion may vary "both tempo-
rally and in kind from individual to individual, making it difficult to attribute a particu-
lar illness to a particular chemical or combination of chemicals." Ginsberg & Weiss,
supra note 8, at 922. Additionally, particularly in the case of long-term latent harm,
intervening causes or contributory causes, such as working in a chemical plant or smok-
ing, may add to the uncertainty. Id. at 922-23. For an analysis of the difficulty and
expense of proving these links in the chain of causation, see id. at 921-24.
81. Elgin v. United States, 89 F. Supp. 195, 197 (W.D. Mo. 1950) (in a claim for
special damages, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that cancerous growth was an actual result of injury sustained in accident).
82. Clevenger v. Labor & Indus. Rel. Comm., 600 S.W.2d 675, 676 (Mo. Ct. App.
1980) ("where a fact finder must determine medical causation that is not within com-
mon knowledge or experience, there must be scientific or medical evidence establishing
the cause and effect relationship between the complained of condition and the asserted
cause"). See also Griggs v. AB Chance Co., 503 S.W.2d 697, 703 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973)
(plaintiff has burden of proof).
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ent in utilizing scientific evidence, Missouri evidence law presents fur-
ther difficulties. Missouri courts apply the Frye test,83 which only
admits evidence that is based upon a scientific principle or discovery
generally accepted in its particular scientific field.84 The Frye test cre-
ates two major difficulties for plaintiffs bringing toxic tort suits. First,
to pass muster under the Frye test, a scientific theory must be in a
"demonstrable" stage rather than in an "experimental" stage.85 Un-
fortunately, proof of environmentally caused injuries almost always is
based on information on the "cutting edge" of scientific knowledge.8 6
As a result, toxicological or epidemiological theories that are essential
to prove causation in a toxics-induced latent injury case may be inad-
missible in court.87 The rigorous proof required before a chain of cau-
83. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
84. Id. at 1014.
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimen-
tal and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone
the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a
long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific
principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be suffi-
ciently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which
it belongs.
Id., quoted in State v. Sager, 600 S.W.2d 541, 562 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (emphasis ad-
ded). The rule has produced the following results: State v. Biddle, 599 S.W.2d 182, 191
(Mo. 1980) (polygraph tests conclusively inadmissible); State v. Sager, 600 S.W.2d 541,
573 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (bite-mark identification admissible); State v. Jackson, 566
S.W.2d 227, 227-28 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (neutron activation analysis results admissible
generally).
The Frye standard has been criticized on the ground that it often results in the exclu-
sion of relevant evidence. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 203, at 490-91 (2d ed.
1972). See also Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, a Half Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197, 1204-28 (1980) (stating the
difficulties in applying the Frye test and the current status of the test). Some jurisdic-
tions have rejected the Frye test for the more liberal Williams rule. The Maine Supreme
Court developed this rule in State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978). In cases when
the proffered expert testimony rests on newly ascertained or applied scientific principles,
the court utilizes a balancing test rather than a per se ban. The balancing test weighs
the probative value, materiality, and reliability of the scientific evidence against its ten-
dency to mislead or prejudice the jury. Id. at 504.
85. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
86. Often, animal tests indicate multiple serious health effects of a chronic nature
resulting from exposure to certain chemicals. The courts, however, have not accepted
these tests as evidence of human health effects. Six CASES, supra note 15, at 488-89.
87. Id. at 487-90. See also Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 8, at 923 ("The net effect is
to require that juries and judges evaluate information in fields far removed from their
usual areas of competence, and make judgments based on conflicting and ambiguous
data.").
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sation becomes generally accepted in the scientific community poses a
second problem for plaintiffs. Scientists may have to show that there is
a ninety-five percent chance that a relationship is causal rather than
chance before their findings will become generally accepted in the sci-
entific community. In contrast, for a plaintiff to establish a causal rela-
tionship that does not rely on scientific evidence, he merely would have
to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the causal relationship
exists.
s8
These practical difficulties in proving causation often force victims to
settle,8 9 accounting for the relative absence of fully adjudicated toxic
injury cases in Missourif 0 One commentator concluded: "The com-
mon law, born in a less complicated era, shies away; victims of complex
injuries of modem technological society need modem solutions." 91
Until the Missouri Legislature or courts shift some of the burden of
proof regarding causation to defendants,92 proof of causation problems
will continue to plague those injured in Missouri by toxic wastes.
88. Six CASES, supra note 15, at 488.
In law, causation is generally proved by demonstrating that it is more likely than
not that X caused Y; in the sciences underlying toxic substances, most notably
toxicology and epidemiology, causation is accepted when there is less than a five
per cent chance that the association could be accidental. Thus, the rigor required
of scientific proof may prevent the generation of information adequate to support
legal recoveries.
Id.
89. See id. at 494-96. Several factors attributable to causation problems discourage
the pursuit of legitimate claims. First, the difficulty of proving causation in a toxic tort
case makes success unlikely or at least uncertain. Second, even if the plaintiffs can
prove causation, the plaintiffs must establish it by using expert medical and scientific
witnesses. These experts, as well as discovery procedures, are very costly. Thus, only
injured persons with extremely large claims can afford to engage in full fledged litiga-
tion. Third, the massive amount of time required to prepare for and litigate a case often
encourages settlement. Finally, the injured victim usually requires quick reparation due
to medical costs. Delay postpones redress of injuries. Id. at 495. One way to eliminate
at least one of these difficulties, excessive costs, is through joinder of parties. Several
individuals in one location may be exposed to hazardous wastes, making joinder practi-
cable. See supra note 64.
90. The only reported decision under the Missouri Hazardous Waste Management
Law involves a declaratory judgment action challenging an order adopted by a county
court to regulate landfills. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Kansas City, Inc. v. Dance,
671 S.W.2d 801 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). For an analysis of the Moscow Mills contamina-
tion case settlement, see Six CASES, supra note 15, at 283-97.
91. Note, supra note 71, at 322-23.
92. Id. at 322. See also INJURIES AND DAMAGES I, supra note 25, at 198-215 (sup-
ports shifting some of the causation burden to the defendant).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol28/iss1/8
HAZARDOUS WASTE LIABILITY
IV. COMMON LAW THEORIES OF REDRESS FOR LATENT
HAZARDOUS WASTE POLLUTION HARM IN MISSOURI
A. Common Law Remedies
The obstacles to proving causation noted above exist regardless of
which common law theory is chosen, whether it is negligence, trespass,
nuisance, or strict liability. The discussion below focuses on additional
hindrances to personal recovery at common law in hazardous waste
pollution cases.93
1. Negligence
Missouri courts have not yet established a cause of action for envi-
ronmental negligence.9 4 Thus, to successfully use a negligence theory,
a plaintiff must show that the defendant failed to exercise "due care."95
A claimant can demonstrate lack of due care by proving a specific envi-
ronmental statutory violation.96 Absent proof of such a violation, a
93. For a commentary on traditional tort law's effectiveness in compensating the
victims of hazardous waste pollution, see generally Toxic TORTS (P. Rheingold, N.
Landau, M. Canavan ed. 1977) (published by Ass'n of Trial Lawyers of America);
Milhollin, supra note 3; Pfennigstorf, Environment, Damages, and Compensation, 1979
A.B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 349. These authors conclude that traditional tort law is
inadequate to compensate those harmed by hazardous waste pollution. But see Hazard-
ous and Toxic Waste Disposal: Hearings on S. 1341 and S. 1480 Before the Subcomm.
on Envtl Protection and Resource Protection of the Senate Comm. on Env't and Pub.
Works, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 349, 683 (1978) (testimony of Jackson Browning and
Frank Friedman, stating that the state tort law is adequate to compensate hazardous
waste pollution victims and that no federal toxic tort cause of action is necessary).
94. 1 THE MISSOURI BAR, MISSOURi TORT LAW § 17.9 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
MISSOURI TORT LAW].
95. See, e.g., Joyce v. Nash, 630 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (actionable
negligence results from failure of a person under a duty of reasonable care to protect
another from injury).
96. A statutory violation constitutes actionable negligence when it appears that
there was a violation of the statute, that the injured party was within the class of per-
sons intended to be protected by the statute, that the injury was of such character as the
statute was designed to prevent, and that the statutory violation was the proximate
cause of the injury. Hartenbach v. Johnson, 628 S.W.2d 684, 687 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
Missouri environmental statutes that plaintiffs may implicate in a negligence per se
claim in hazardous waste litigation are: The Missouri Hazardous Waste Law, Mo.
REV. STAT. §§ 260.350-.609 (1978 & Supp. 1983); the Missouri Pesticide Use Act, id.
§§ 281.010-. 115; the Missouri Pesticide Registration Act, id. §§ 263.269-.380; the Solid
Waste Disposal Act, id. §§ 260.200-.245; the Missouri Clean Water Law, id.
§§ 240.006-.141; the Missouri Air Conservation Law, id. §§ 230.010-.195; and the Radi-
ation Control Law, id. §§ 192.400-.490. All of these statutes create statutory standards
of conduct. Using proof of a statutory violation may ease the plaintiff's burden in show-
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claimant may prove lack of due care by showing that the defendant
breached a common law duty owed to him and, therefore, created a
foreseeable and unreasonable risk of injury.97 Demonstrating unrea-
sonableness and foreseeability presents substantial difficulties in toxics
litigation. A defendant can rebut an allegation of unreasonableness by
showing that technical and economic factors at the time of the expo-
sure made his actions reasonable under the circumstances. 98 Proving
foreseeability presents similar difficulties. The uncertainties associated
with toxic wastes, such as their effects on human health, make an un-
foreseeability defense a likely barrier to recovery. 99 Because of these
obstacles to recovery, plaintiffs rarely seek recovery under a negligence
theory in environmental pollution casesic°°
ing that the defendant's action constituted a foreseeable and unreasonable risk. A statu-
tory violation, however, does not prove causation. SIx CASES, supra note 15, at 303.
97. Kelley v. National Lead Co., 240 Mo. App. 47, 210 S.W.2d 728, 734 (1948).
98. Six CASES, supra note 15, at 298-99. In Kelley v. National Lead Co., 240 Mo.
App. 47, 210 S.W.2d 728 (1948), noxious fumes from the defendant's chemical manu-
facturing plant escaped and caused personal and property damage to the plaintiff. The
plaintiff alleged that the discharge constituted negligence because the factory failed to
employ an available anti-pollution device that could have prevented the harmful dis-
charge. The court disagreed, stating that because the device was not "on the market"
and "required testing and experimentation," the defendant owed the plaintiff no duty to
install the device. Id. at 734.
99. Six CASES, supra note 15, at 299. Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492
(8th Cir. 1975), illustrates this point. The case concerned whether the defendant's
dumping of asbestiform particulate waste into Lake Superior could be enjoined as a
health hazard. A major factual issue at trial was whether asbestiform particules passing
through the digestive tract were toxic. At the time of trial, only the asbestiform parti-
cles entering through the respiratory system were known to be toxic. The court con-
cluded that it was impossible to know whether asbestiform particles in the digestive
system could cause cancer, stating:
On the record it cannot be forecast that the rates of cancer will increase from
drinking Lake Superior water or breathing Silver Bay air. The best that can be said
is that the existence of this asbestos contamination in air and water gives rise to a
reasonable medical concern for the public health.
Id. at 520.
For additional information regarding Reserve Mining, see generally Note, Reserve
Mining-The Standard of Proof Required to Enjoin an Environmental Hazard to the
Public Health, 59 MiNN. L. REv. 893 (1975). One commentator speculated about the
long-term effects of Reserve Mining's dumping:
A tort plaintiff twenty years from now, with a claim that Reserve did not use "due
care," will be faced with the argument that the asbestos hazard was not apparent
until years after Reserve began the emissions, and that even when it became appar-
ent, the risk remained unknown.
Milhollin, supra note 3, at 6-7.
100. Six CASES, supra note 15, at 299. Recovery in negligence was awarded, how-
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2. Trespass
Trespass involves a physical invasion of a claimant's possessory in-
terest in land.10 1 In Missouri, parties are liable for damages resulting
from trespass, regardless of whether the parties were negligent.'0 2 This
automatic liability is the major advantage trespass theory provides for
victims of hazardous waste pollution in Missouri.
10 3
In cases involving invasion of a claimant's property by a toxic sub-
stance, however, trespass theory also presents problems for claimants.
For example, Missouri courts may insist upon a tangible physical inva-
sion of property to find that a trespass has occurred. Most toxic sub-
stances, like dioxin and asbestos, are microscopic and, therefore,
intangible."° Moreover, relatively no legal precedent exists in Mis-
ever, in Faire v. Burke, 363 Mo. 562, 252 S.W.2d 289 (1952). The case involved the
negligent spraying of a herbicide, which resulted in damage to the plaintiff's crops. The
court stated that the defendant failed to use due care in making sure that weather condi-
tions were acceptable for crop dusting. Id. at 564-66, 252 S.W.2d at 292-93. This case,
while it does involve recovery for harm caused by a toxic substance, is based on straight-
forward, nonattenuated facts and, therefore, is of questionable precedential value in a
modem toxic tort case.
101. See, e.g., Looney v. Hindman, 649 S.W.2d 207, 212 (Mo. 1983) (discharge of
surface waters onto another's property); Mawson v. Vess Beverage Co., 173 S.W.2d
606, 612-13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1943) (personal injury attributable to the defendant's metal
advertising signs tacked up on the plaintiff's property).
102. See, e.g., Baker v. Newcomb, 621 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). This
approach accounts for the lack of pollution cases brought and settled on a strict liability
theory. See infra notes 130-33 and accompanying text. Most jurisdictions have repudi-
ated common law strict liability in trespass. P. KEETON, supra note 36, § 13, at 69.
103. In most jurisdictions, the plaintiff must base a trespass action on intentional,
negligent, or ultrahazardous activities. P. KEETON, supra note 36, § 13, at 67-76. Mis-
souri courts, however, historically have rejected independent strict liability theory in
pollution-related cases. This rejection may explain why the old common law rules of
strict liability in trespass retain vitality in Missouri today.
104. Although the law is changing, some approaches require tangible or visible in-
vasions to find trespass. Id. at 70. Missouri courts have not yet squarely ruled on this
issue. MISSOURI TORT LAW, supra note 94, § 17.8. Cf. Summers v. Tavern Rock Sand
Co., 315 S.W.2d 201, 203 (Mo. 1958) (couched in the language of trespass, strict liabil-
ity was imposed on defendant conducting blasting operations).
The trend in jurisdictions granting a trespass cause of action for intangible invasions
is to use a balancing test analogous to the test used in nuisance cases. See, eg., Martin
v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Ore. 86, 98, 342 P.2d 790, 795 (two step balancing test
adopted to determine when an invasion by intangible matter is a trespass), cert denied,
362 U.S. 918 (1959). Therefore, the difficulties of prevailing on a balancing test also
could apply in trespass. See infra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
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souri for pollution-related personal injury claims based on trespass." 5
3. Nuisance
Nuisance is the backbone of modem environmental law.'0 6 The
courts use this common law doctrine more than any other to address
pollution-induced harm. This theory supplements the existing catego-
ries of liability for latent harm by offering the injunction to halt imme-
diately the specified activity.'0 7 A plaintiff can allege either a private
nuisance or a public nuisance. A private nuisance occurs when inten-
tional activity on one party's property substantially interferes with the
property, person, or health of others.'0 8 A public nuisance results
when one party's activities unreasonably and substantially interfere
with a right to which every citizen is entitled, such as the right to
travel.1 0 9 Missouri courts frequently invoke this theory to find nui-
sances in cases involving water pollution,"o noise, l  explosives,'
12
well contamination, 113 and manufacturing plants.' 14 Like trespass, a
finding of a nuisance need not be based on the defendant's
105. But see Tavernaro v. Dunn, 563 S.W.2d 114, 116 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (tres-
pass case involving dumping of trash and debris on the plaintiff's property).
106. Note, supra note 71, at 320.
107. See P. KEETON, supra note 36, §§ 88A, 89, 90, at 630-33, 637-52. See also
Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., Inc., 86 Ill. 2d 1, 426 N.E.2d 824 (1981). In
Wilsonville, the Illinois Supreme Couirt affirmed the lower court's issuance of a perma-
nent injunction against a hazardous waste disposal site on the grounds that the site
constituted a current and prospective nuisance. The site held hazardous substances
such as PCBs, solid cyanide, paint sludge, asbestos, pesticides, mercury, and arsenic.
The court reached this result by noting the extreme hazards that the site produced: the
potential explosive interaction of the chemicals deposited at the site, the threat of haz-
ardous waste migration due to the permeable nature of the soil at the site, and the
hazardous waste seepage into the groundwater due to soil subsidence of the earth, cre-
ated a "dangerous probability" that the threatened injury would occur. The court rea-
soned that because this "dangerous probability" of harm existed, the lower court
properly enjoined the site as a prospective nuiance. Id. at 25, 426 N.E.2d at 836.
108. Boiler v. Texas E. Transmission Corp., 87 F. Supp. 603, 605 (E.D. Mo. 1949)
(operation of a booster station on a natural gas pipeline not an actionable nuisance).
109. Biggs v. Griffith, 231 S.W.2d 875, 881 (Mo. Ct. App. 1950) (public address
system did not substantially interfere with public right).
110. See, e.g., Harrisonville v. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334 (1933); Barlett v.
Hume-Sinclair Coal Mining Co., 351 S.W.2d 214 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961).
111. See, eg., Crutcher v. Taystee Bread Co. 174 S.W.2d 801 (Mo. 1943).
112. See, eg., St. Joseph Lead Co. v. Prather, 238 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1956); Schnit-
zer v. Excelsior Powder Mfg. Co., 160 S.W. 282 (Mo. Ct. App. 1912).
113. See, e.g., Haynor v. Excelsior Springs Light, Power, Heat & Water Co., 129
Mo. App. 691, 108 S.W. 580 (1908).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol28/iss1/8
HAZARDOUS WASTE LIABILITY
negligence. 115
Again, however, major limitations exist on the doctrine's utility.
The substantial burden of proving causation 1 6 and the "property
bias""' 7 discussed in Part II obstruct recovery in nuisance. In addi-
tion, courts apply a balancing test in private nuisance actions to deter-
mine whether an invasion is "unreasonable."" ' 8 This test weighs the
utility of the defendant's action against the magnitude of the harm to
the plaintiff." 9 The test necessarily introduces social and economic
utility, technological infeasibility, and scientific uncertainties into the
judicial calculus. Consequently, recovery becomes difficult.12 ° This is
true especially when the incident at issue occurred decades before trial.
In addition, the character of the surrounding neighborhood often is a
crucial factor in the nuisance balancing test. 121 As a result, hazardous
polluting activities rarely are enjoined in industrialized-and unfortu-
nately often heavily populated-areas. 2 2 Courts also apply this bal-
114. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Missouri Power & Light Co., 89 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1936).
115. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Burlington Northern, 514 S.W.2d 593, 602 (Mo. 1974).
116. See supra notes 65-83 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Bellflower v. Pennise,
548 F.2d 776, 778 (8th Cir. 1977) (to constitute an actionable nuisance, maintenance of
nuisance must be a natural and proximate cause of injury).
117. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Rebel v. Big Tarkio
Drainage Dist., 602 S.W.2d 787, 791 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (action for private nuisance
rests upon tort liability for unreasonable interference with use and enjoyment of land).
118. See Rebel v. Big Tarkio Drainage Dist., 602 S.W.2d 787, 791 (Mo. Ct. App.
1980) (nuisance action based on the unreasonable interference with the use and enjoy-
ment of land).
119. Clinic & Hosp. v. McConnell, 241 Mo. App. 223, 233, 236 S.W.2d 384, 391
(1951). The balance takes into account the following factors: the locality and character
of the surrounding neighborhood, the nature, utility, and social value of the activity
involved, and the nature, utility, and social value of the interest harmed. Id. at 233, 236
S.W.2d at 391.
120. Six CASES, supra note 15, at 308-09. Even if a court rules that a nuisance
exists, it still employs an additional balancing test to decide which remedy is appropri-
ate. This balancing judgment often frustrates attempts to enjoin polluting activities.
See, e.g., United States v. Vertac Chemical Corp., 489 F. Supp. 870, 887-88 (E.D. Ark.
1980) (after balancing the benefits conferred and the hazards created by the plant, the
court did not order the closure of an Agent Orange plant that it found to be a public
nuisance).
121. See, e.g., Fuchs v. Curran Carbonizing & Eng'g Co., 279 S.W.2d 211,218 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1955) (resident of area zoned "light industrial" cannot expect the same free-
dom from air pollution as that enjoyed by residents of residential districts).
122. See, e.g., Chicago v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 24 Ill. App. 3d 624, 632, 321
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ancing test prospectively in injunction proceedings. 123 This test,
therefore, can preclude the plaintiff from thwarting possible future
harm.124
If the nuisance is public, injured persons vested with interest in land
may recover.1 25 Although some Missouri statutes define what consti-
tutes a public nuisance within their subject matter, 126 the Missouri
Hazardous Waste Management Law offers no guidance.
Activity constitutes a public nuisance if it substantially interferes
with a public right.127 A private individual, however, may not bring
suit unless his injury is "different in kind"-that is, more aggravated
from that suffered by the general public.128 Unfortunately, both re-
quirements rarely will be met in toxics-induced personal injury
cases. 1
2 9
N.E.2d 412, 418 (1974) ("Courts . . . have traditionally been reluctant to enjoin an
industrial operation unless it is clearly and satisfactorily proven to be a nuisance.").
123. See, eg., Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., Inc., 86 Ill. 2d 1, 6, 426 N.E.2d
824, 836 (1981) (court must find that activity to be prospectively enjoined creates a
"dangerous probability" that threatened injury will occur).
124. The "dangerous probability" standard may be too lenient in cases involving
high risk hazardous waste sites. See Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., Inc., 86 111. 2d
1, 38, 426 N.E.2d 824, 842 (1981) (Ryan, J., concurring) (hazardous waste site disposal
operations entail "ultrahazardous activity" and, therefore, a lesser risk than inheres in
the "dangerous probability" of harm standard can support prospective injunctive relief
in nuisance). It is unclear at this time whether Missouri courts will adopt this more
lenient approach in hazardous waste cases. One case suggested such an approach, using
a "reasonable likelihood" of harm test. See Village of Claycomo v. City of Kansas City,
635 S.W.2d 365, 370 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (injunction case remanded to determine
whether operation of a sanitary landfill would produce a reasonable likelihood of
threatened injury).
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C (Tent. Draft Nov. 16, 1970).
126. See, e.g., Missouri Clean Water Law, Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 204.006-.141 (1978
& Supp. 1983) (statement of policy, id., § 204.011, gives guidelines regarding public
nuisance).
127. See, e.g., Lademan v. Lamb Constr. Co., 297 S.W. 184, 186 (Mo. Ct. App.
1927) (operation of quarry does not interfere with a right held by the public).
128. Id.
129. For instance, the Shenandoah Stables contamination incident, supra note 15,
probably was not a public nuisance. The contamination affected only a few people
affiliated with the stables and, therefore, did not affect a right held in common by the
public. Thus, even though the victims' injury was "different in kind" from that suffered
by the general public, no private action in public nuisance could pertain. Six CASES,
supra note 15, at 307. If, however, the contaminated soil was dug up and used under a
highway roadbed, it could create a public nuisance if the toxic waste escaped into the
surrounding environment, thereby affecting the public's right to travel. Then the people
of Shenandoah Stables could have brought a private action in public nuisance. Id. See
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4. Strict Liability
Missouri courts extend liability without fault to certain activities
"fraught with danger"'130 that result in harm to the plaintiff. Except in
cases involving defective products, strict liability in Missouri is applied
infrequently and inconsistently. 3 ' Missouri courts never have used
the doctrine in a pollution-related case. 132 Instead, in these cases
courts often employ strict liability principles within the better-devel-
oped common law actions of trespass or nuisance. 133 Missouri courts
Town of East Troy v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 653 F.2d 1123, 1132-34 (7th Cir. 1980) (dam-
ages for public nuisance awarded to a town against a railroad company that negligently
polluted the town's drinking water).
130. Carson v. Blodgett Constr. Co., 174 S.W. 447, 448 (Mo. Ct. App. 1915) ("It is
well established that the use of high explosives in blasting. . . is so fraught with danger
that the person using same .. . is held liable ...without proof of negligence.").
Neither Restatement formulation of strict liability has been expressly adopted in Mis-
souri. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 519 (1938) ("ultrahazardous activity"); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1976) ("abnormally dangerous activity").
131. Missouri courts have ruled that blasting operations give rise to strict liability.
See, e.g., Schaefer v. Frazier-Davis Constr. Co., 125 S.W.2d 897, 898 (Mo. Ct. App.
1939); Stocker v. Richmond Heights, 235 Mo. App. 277, 277-78, 132 S.W.2d 116, 117
(1939); Carson v. Blodgett Constr. Co., 174 S.W. 447, 448 (Mo. Ct. App. 1915). Many
other decisions, however, base liability for blasting on nuisance or trespass. See, e.g.,
Rotert v. Peabody Coal Co., 513 S.W.2d 667, 677-78 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (blasting
operation a nuisance); Smith v. Aldridge, 356 S.W.2d 532, 534 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962)
(blasting operation results in trespass).
132. MISSOURI TORT LAW, supra note 94, § 17.13.
133. See Comment, The Rylands v. Fletcher Doctrine and its Standing in Missouri,
18 Mo. L. REV. 53, 56-60 (1953). Originally, Missouri courts rejected the doctrine of
Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 Exch. 774 (1865), afl'd, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (E. & I. App.
1868), the case upon which strict liability is generally founded. See, e.g., Kelley v. Na-
tional Lead Co., 240 Mo. App. 47, 58, 210 S.W.2d 728, 733 (1948) (liability cannot be
imposed upon the owner or occupant of land for damages caused by substances from his
premises except upon proof of negligence on his part). Rylands involved a defendant
mill owner that employed engineers to build a reservoir upon his lands. The reservoir
was built directly above an abandoned mine shaft. When the reservoir was filled with
water, the mine shaft collapsed, causing water to flow onto and damage the adjoining
property. In ruling for the adjoining property holder, the court stated that one who for
his own purpose brings on his lands anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must
keep it at his peril, and is prima facie responsible for all damage that is the natural
consequence of its escape. Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. 3 Exch. 774 (1865). The appellate
court affirmed and qualified the rule by extending it only to non-natural uses of land.
Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (E. & I. App. 1868).
Kelley v. National Lead Co., 240 Mo. App. 47, 48, 210 S.W.2d 728, 733 (1948),
expressly rejected the Rylands doctrine. The reluctance to apply strict liability persists.
One commentator concluded that opposition to the doctrine in Missouri is based "to a
great extent" on adherence to the earlier cases. See Comment, supra, at 55. These
earlier cases apply strict liability theory within the trespass and nuisance actions. These
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have not yet ruled as to whether any of these applications of strict lia-
bility theory apply to the generation, transportation, storage, or dispo-
sal of hazardous wastes.1
34
Missouri strict products liability law is relatively well developed.135
Courts, however, may find the application of products liability doctrine
to toxics-induced harm inconsistent with the doctrine's purpose as it
has been developed in Missouri. Missouri decisions hold that products
liability law imposes a duty on manufacturers to avoid introducing into
commerce unreasonably dangerous products. 136  It is unlikely that
Missouri courts, restrained in their application of strict liability in pol-
lution-related cases, will define hazardous waste as a product. To do
so, courts must re-define the term "product" to include the entire man-
ufacturing process from raw materials to waste. 137 No Missouri cases
actions were particularly suited for non-toxic pollutant cases, because the pollutant was
tangible and the harm was immediate and apparent.
134. The case for applying strict liability for these activities is a good one. See infra
notes 169-90 and accompanying text. This approach, however, has little precedent in
Missouri. Courts decide most pollution related cases in Missouri using nuisance or
trespass law. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text. See also Pecan Shoppe of
Springfield Mo., Inc. v. Tri-State Motor Transit Co., 573 S.W.2d 431, 438-39 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1978) (strict liability inapplicable to harm that results from the transport of explo-
sives); Green v. Spinning, 48 S.W.2d 51, 61 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932) (rejecting strict liabil-
ity for storage of gasoline at a filling station). See infra note 196 for further discussion
of Pecan Shoppe.
135. Strict product liability under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS is ac-
cepted doctrine in Missouri. See, e.g., Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d
362, 364 (Mo. 1969). Section 402A of the RESTATEMENT states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (I) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 402A (1965).
136. MISSOURI SUPREME COURT COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS, MISSOURI AP-
PROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 25.05 (3d ed. 1981). See, e.g., Racer v. Utterman,
629 S.W.2d 387, 392-93 (Mo. 1981) (producer of flammable surgical drape strictly liable
for injuries caused by fire), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 803 (1982).
137. See Note, supra note 71, at 320. The author concluded: "Rather than redefin-
ing 'product' to mean the entire manufacturing process from raw material to waste, it
might be better to develop a new doctrine of waste liability or strict toxic or hazardous
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indicate acceptance of this approach.
B. Summary
Missouri law reflects the substantial obstacles to recovery for toxic
tort victims. Difficulties in isolating the proper parties are inherent in
toxics litigation, yet this problem is largely unaddressed in the Missouri
Hazardous Waste Management Law. 13 8 Missouri's statute of limita-
tions employs the "discoverable rule," which can bar some meritorious
latent harm claims.' 39 Finally, the common law remedies available to
latent harm victims are outmoded and ineffective. In addition to their
other inadequacies discussed above,"4 all the remedies place the heavy
burden of proving legal causation. 4' squarely on the plaintiff. This
burden normally is too substantial for a party injured decades before
the litigation to sustain.
The failure of common law remedies to compensate victims of haz-
ardous waste pollution produces untoward consequences. One benefi-
cial result of tort law, in addition to compensating victims for legal
wrongs, is discouraging unsafe conduct by making tortfeasors pay for
their transgressions.' 42 This result will not be attained if toxics victims
are redressed insufficiently for their injuries. Put simply, dangerous
conduct that goes "unpunished" is dangerous conduct that will
continue. 14
3
substance liability." Id. For a strong argument that contaminated waste oil used as a
dust suppressant is a "product" under Missouri product liability law, see Six CASES,
supra note 15, at 314-17.
138. The Missouri Hazardous Waste Management Law, Mo. REv. STAT.
§§ 260.350-.609 (1978 & Supp. 1983), does not provide a personal injury compensation
fund for victims that cannot locate the responsible parties or that encounter responsible
parties that are insolvent. Id.
139. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 94-137 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 73-91 and accompanying text.
142. In theory, harmful behavior will discontinue or at least be made safer if the
costs of the dangerous behavior, including the total injury compensation expense, are
greater than the monetary benefits that the activity generates. See G. CALABRESI, THE
COST OF ACcIDENTs 68-94 (1970).
143. The economics of tort law is beyond the scope of this Note. General princi-
ples, however, should be elucidated. An efficient tort liability scheme shifts costs to the
party whose activity or product caused the harm. In theory, this cost-shifting, in addi-
tion to compensating the victim, should produce two results: 1) It should force the
responsible party to pay the true aggregate cost of his activity; and 2) it should compel
the responsible party to internalize this cost. For a defendant vendor, this cost shifting
can produce varying results. The defendant that internalizes the cost of his activity and
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Ideally, a hazardous waste management statute should remedy these
common law inadequacies. Unfortunately, the Missouri Hazardous
Waste Management Law does not. The statute fails to provide a per-
sonal cause of action for toxics victims and a fund from which they can
recover, and, therefore, fails to provide the structure needed to com-
pensate victims and deter unsafe conduct in this inherently dangerous
activity.
V. MISSOURI'S STATUTORY RESPONSE TO THE HAZARDOUS
WASTE PROBLEM
In 1977, the Missouri General Assembly enacted the Hazardous
Waste Management Law. 1" This act was designed to regulate hazard-
ous waste generation, transportation, and disposal in the state.'4 5 In
1983, responding to the pressing dioxin problem, 146 the legislature ad-
ded the "Superfund"1 47 provision to the statute. This amendment im-
poses an additional fee and tax on generators of hazardous waste.
1 48
increases the price of his good either will suffer or prosper. The result will depend on
how well the market responds to a higher-priced product. Theoretically, the defendant
will have to alter its risky practices to avoid compensation costs in order to remain
competitive. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 142, at 69-75. For an overview of how tort
law fails to produce economic incentives to reduce activities that pollute the environ-
ment, see Trauberman, supra note 10, at 184-90. For an argument that tort law should
abandon the goal of safety enhancement, see Pierce, Encouraging Safety: The Limits of
Tort Law and Government Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REv. 1281, 1290-1300 (1980).
144. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 260.350-.609 (1978 & Supp. 1983).
145. The law creates a four-member Hazardous Waste Commission. Id. § 260.365.
In addition to being responsible for enforcing the Act, some of their duties and powers
include:
Establishing rules and regulations involving: the definition of "hazardous waste"
under the Act [id. § 260.370-3(1)(a)]; the storage, treatment and disposal of haz-
ardous wastes [id. § 260.370-3(1)(b)]; the transportation, containerization and la-
beling of hazardous waste [id. § 260.370-3(l)(c)]; the issuance of licenses and
permits [id. § 260.370-3(1)(d)]; the standards for safe operation of hazardous waste
facilities [id. § 260.370-3(I)(e)]; the standards for the reporting requirements [id.
§ 260.370-3(l)(g)]; and hearing requirements [id. §§ 260.370-3(2),(3)].
Id. § 260.370. Other provisions impose safety requirements for generators (id.
§ 260.380), transporters (id. § 260.385), and hazardous waste facility owners or opera-
tors (id. § 260.390).
146. See supra notes 12-23 and accompanying text.
147. Mo. REv. STAT. § 260.480 (Supp. 1983).
148. Id. § 260.475. The amendment imposes a $25 per ton fee annually on all haz-
ardous waste that is discharged, deposited, dumped, or placed into or on the soil as a
final action, and a $2 per ton fee on all other hazardous waste transported off-site. Id.
Additionally, another section imposes a quarterly tax on all Missouri employers regis-
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The revenue obtained is used to conduct health studies, acquire con-
taminated property, pay for expanded hazardous waste clean-up, and
respond to hazardous waste emergencies' 49 The amendment also es-
tablishes comprehensive information reporting requirements. "0
The original law and its amendment, however, conspicuously lack
both a statutory cause of action for personal injury caused by exposure
to toxic waste and a fund from which victims can recover.'51 This
omission is unjust in light of the breadth of the toxics problem,152 the
future harm it will cause,' 53 and the inadequacy of Missouri's common
law causes of action.154 There is a corresponding lack of federal pro-
tection for toxic tort victims.55 Thus, in the future, Missourians in-
tered as hazardous waste generators, of $2 per covered worker. Id. § 260.478. A "gen-
erator" is any person who produces waste. Id. § 260.360(8) (1978 & Supp. 1983).
149. See id. § 260.480.
150. Section 260.440 establishes a registry of abandoned or uncontrolled waste sites;
9 260.445 requires the Department of Natural Resources to submit a detailed report
pertaining to these sites; § 260.450 requires the Hazardous Waste Commission to deter-
mine the relative priority of each site in Missouri. The Commission must make avail-
able all of this information to the public, subject to specified exceptions. Id. § 260.550.
Trade secrets, however, are protected from disclosure. Id. § 260.430(1).
151. The House Committee Bill, however, did contain a cause of action for those
injured by hazardous waste exposure and a provision for recovery from the fund. The
House Committee Substitute for House Bill 528, § 260.485, stated: "The generation,
transportation, disposal, and otherwise handling of hazardous waste shall be deemed an
ultrahazardous activity and persons engaged in such activity shall be strictly, jointly,
and severally liable in tort for injuries resulting therefrom." Mo. House Comm. Subst.
for H.B. 528, § 260.485 (Feb. 9, 1983).
Several commentators have called for the creation of a specific statutory cause of
action for hazardous waste induced injury. See generally Milhollin, supra note 3, at 16;
Trauberman, supra note 10, at 258, 263; Note, Strict Liability for Generators, Transport-
ers and Disposers of Hazardous Wastes, 64 MINN. L. REv. 949 (1980). Additionally, the
Committee Bill advocated the use of the newly created Hazardous Waste Remedial
Fund to compensate those injured by hazardous waste exposure. Mo. House Comm.
Subst. for H.B. 528 § 260.480 (Feb. 9, 1983). Section 260.480 stated: "The Division of
Health is authorized to approve reimbursement for health related expenditures limited
to treatment for illnesses caused by exposure to hazardous waste. Such approval shall
be submitted to the department for payment out of the hazardous waste remedial fund."
Id. Finally, to guard against the Fund's depletion, the Bill provides that the Fund is
subrogated to the compensated victim's claims against the party responsible for the
victim's injury. See id. § 260.475(4).
152. See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 94-137 and accompanying text.
155 The much heralded Federal Superfund Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982),
formally known as the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act, provides little compensation for personal injury caused by hazardous
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jured by exposure to toxic substances will be without an effective legal
remedy. The Superfund Amendment is a step in the right direction. 15 6
It fails, however, to go far enough in protecting Missouri citizens from
the toxic waste problem. The Missouri General Assembly should
amend the Hazardous Waste Management Law further to provide a
statutory cause of action for those injured by toxics exposure.
waste contamination. The statute imposes liability on responsible parties for the gov-
ernment's response costs, and for specified damages to natural resources. Id. § 9607.
But see supra note 32 (post-closure liability fund).
In addition to the absence of an effective cause of action for victims of hazardous
waste pollution, the federal agencies are falling in their attempts to control the hazard-
ous waste problem. By early 1984, only 115 of the 8,000 active hazardous waste facili-
ties in the nation had been inspected and granted an EPA operating permit. In
addition, the EPA required only 3% of the manufacturers of the over 3,000 new chemi-
cals that the agency screened to provide additional information. Fifty percent of the
reports submitted contained no health data whatsoever and 80% of the reports con-
tained no chronic disease risk information. Recently, the General Accounting Office
found that 78% of the active hazardous waste facilities are ignoring the basic require-
ment to test and determine whether their operations contaminated groundwater.
Eighty-two percent of 531 major sources of water pollution are breaking environmental
laws. The Reagan Administration has cut funding deeply for the agencies responsible
for implementing environmental law. These funding cuts are part of the reason for
these dismal performance statistics. For instance, the EPA's protective program funds
were cut by approximately 35%, even though EPA data showed that the recent toxic
waste problem doubled the program's workload. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Aug. 6, 1984,
at 3B, col. 1. (Report by William Drayton, chairman of Environmental Safety, Wash-
ington, D.C.). Thus, state law remains the most important means for protecting against
and redressing personal injury resulting from toxic substances pollution. For additional
information on the Federal Superfund Act, see generally Note, supra note 8.
156. The amendment's recordkeeping and information requirements will aid vic-
tims in litigating their claims. For instance, the registry of abandoned hazardous waste
sites required by § 260.440 can provide future plaintiffs, perhaps those that lived next to
the site, with information concerning the exact type of waste existing there. Mo. REv.
STAT. § 260.440 (Supp. 1983). Additionally, the amendment requires that an annual
report, which summarizes any significant environmental problems at or near the site, be
given to the Governor each year. Id. § 260.445. This information can alert citizens that
they have been harmed by toxic waste exposure and may avoid statute of limitations
problems discussed earlier. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text. Finally, the
information included in § 260.450 can be especially helpful to a plaintiff struggling to
prove causation. This section requires the director to identify the following factors that
are material to the issue of causation: 1) The site boundaries; 2) the time period for use
for disposal of wastes; 3) the current and past owners of the site during the time period
of use for disposal of hazardous waste; 4) the names of persons responsible for the gen-
eration and transportation of the hazardous waste disposal of, and 5) the type, quantity,
and manner of hazardous waste disposed of. Id. § 260.450. Unfortunately, this infor-
mation will be unavailable to the scores of people exposed to hazardous wastes in Mis-
souri before the legislature promulgated these recordkeeping requirements.
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A. Overview of the Proposal
This Note advocates the adoption of the statutory cause of action set
forth in the Missouri "Superfund" Amendment House Committee
Bill.157 This bill provided for a strict liability cause of action: it labeled
generation, transportation, and disposal of hazardous waste "ultra-haz-
ardous activities."15 Additionally, the bill called for joint and several
liability for responsible defendants. 59 Finally, the bill allowed victims
to bring personal injury claims against a Hazardous Waste Remedial
Fund."6 This Note also incorporates in its proposal additional recom-
mendations that appear in a model statute on the subject, the Chemical
Injury Liability Act-hereinafter referred to as the Model Statute.16 1
B. Goals of New Statutory Scheme
The goals of a new statutory cause of action should parallel the goals
of traditional tort law: compensating victims of legal wrongs and dis-
couraging unsafe behavior. 162
C. Specific Reforms
1. Toxic Tort Statutes of Limitations
A statute of limitations is designed to prevent stale claims. Special
considerations, however, exist in latent harm litigation. Missouri's
statute of limitations for tort claims fails to address adequately the un-
157. Mo. House Comm. Subst. for H.B. 528 (Feb. 9, 1983). See supra note 137.
This bill can be credited to the Missouri Public Interest Research Group (MoPIRG).
In response to the revelation of the dioxin problem in Missouri, MoPIRG recom-
mended the creation of a statutory state superfund provision. The MoPIRG proposal
was based upon New York's superfund law, N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 27-0701
to -1319 (McKinney Supp. 1982). Representative Bob Feigenbaum, a Democrat from
Ferguson, sponsored this proposal.
158. Mo. House Comm. Subst. for H.B. 528, § 260.485 (Feb. 9, 1983).
159. Id.
160. Id. § 260.480. This Note advocates the creation of a separate fund for personal
injury claims. See infra notes 222-34 and accompanying text.
161. The proposed Model Statute is set forth in Trauberman, supra note 10, at 250-
96 [hereinafter cited as the Model Statute]. The Model Statute creates a personal injury
fund, funded by hazardous waste disposers. Aggrieved parties can hold the fund strictly
liable for hazardous waste injury. The Model Statute also provides presumptions, ex-
panded evidentiary rules, and a liberal statute of limitations to aid victims of hazardous
waste pollution in recovery. See id.
162. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
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certainties inherent in toxics litigation.163 The Model Statute's limita-
tions period allows a toxic tort victim to file a claim within two years
after the disease 164 becomes apparent and such individual "by the exer-
cise of due care, could have established, with reasonable likelihood,
that [a specified party] caused or was a substantial factor in causing
such disease." 16' The rule's objective standard 166 prevents the unfair-
ness of barring an injured party's claim merely because he does not link
his injury to its cause in a timely manner.' 67 Missouri should adopt
this statute of limitations to avert this harsh result.1 68
2. Generating, Transporting, and Disposing of Hazardous Waste as
"Ultrahazardous Activities"
The original Restatement of Torts' "ultrahazardous activity" doc-
trine169 is the most logical strict liability theory to apply to hazardous
163. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text. Cf Note, Statutes of Limita-
tions and the Discovery Rule in Latent Injury Claims: An Exception or the Law?, 43 U.
PITT. L. REV. 501, 523 (1982) (examining different rules and concluding that the "dis-
covery rule" is the most consistent with basic principles of tort recovery).
164. Under the Model Statute, a covered disease is "any medically verifiable chronic
or progressive disease or condition such as cancer, genetic mutation, behavioral abnor-
malities, physiological malfunction (including malfunction in reproduction) and physi-
cal deformation in humans or their offspring, or death." Trauberman, supra note 10,
§ 102(h), at 252. The Model Statute focuses on chronic injury caused by toxic waste
pollution because this type of harm presents the most difficulties in proving causation of
trial.
165. Trauberman, supra note 10, § 217(2), at 285.
166. The objective standard allows the jury to determine when the victim should
have discovered the nexus between the exposure and harm. Id. at 218.
167. "It would be inappropriate simply to run the limitations period from the date
of manifestation, because a toxics victim might be unable to determine that the injury
was caused by chemical exposure." Id.
168. This type of limitations period has been recommended by a number of authori-
ties. See INJURIES AND DAMAGES I, supra note 25, at 240-41; Note, Statutes of Limita-
tions and Pollutant Injuries: The Need for a Contemporary Legal Response to
Contemporary Technological Failure, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1525, 1568-73 (1981) (Pro-
posed Uniform Toxic Substances Statute of Limitations). In addition, this limitations
period already is incorporated into a number of federal and state laws. See Ritts, Occu-
pational Cancer and Statutes of Limitations in Occupational Disease Claims, WORK-
MAN'S COMPENSATION L. REV. 70, 96-99, 106-17 (1981).
169. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 519 (1938) states:
One who carries on an ultrahazardous activity is liable to another whose person,
land or chattels the actor should recognize as likely to be harmed by the unprevent-
able miscarriage of the activity for harm resulting thereto from that which makes
the activity ultrahazardous, although the utmost care is exercised to prevent the
harm.
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waste-related activities. This formulation of strict liability does not
scrutinize the "naturalness" 17 or the "appropriateness"' 17 1 to the loca-
tion where the activity is conducted. These considerations are inappro-
priate when activity capable of causing serious and widespread harm is
involved.
172
Section 520 of the original Restatement defines an ultrahazardous
activity as one that "(a) necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to
the person, land or chattels of others which cannot be eliminated by
the exercise of utmost care, and (b) is not a matter of common us-
age." 1 73 After Love Canal, Times Beach and other similar disasters, it
is clear that toxic wastes produce a risk of serious harm despite utmost
care. It is equally indisputable that the generation, transportation, and
disposal of potentially deadly toxic substances capable of causing cata-
strophic harm through groundwater or food chain contamination is
not a matter of common usage: potential victims of harmful hazardous
waste exposure, in other words, can do little to protect themselves from
this danger.
The application of strict liability to hazardous waste related endeav-
ors is consistent with case law. Generally, courts invoke this doctrine
when the activity presents unusual and unavoidable risks such as blast-
ing, 7 4 drilling for oil,175 storing of large amounts of dynamite, 176 keep-
Id.
170. See Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868) (imposing strict liability for
escape of substances likely to cause harm and for a dangerous nonnatural use of land).
171. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1976). This formulation of
strict liability expressly includes in its analysis the "inappropriateness of the activity to
the place where it is carried on." Id. § 520(e).
172. Small amounts of toxic chemicals can result in serious health risks. For exam-
ple, a release of a toxic chemical can result in contamination of groundwater or, more
serious, enter into the food chain. Thus, the location of the activity has little relevance
because potential harm can be so far-reaching. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying
text. This rationale only holds true, however, for toxic wastes capable of causing wide-
spread harm. The ultrahazardous activity doctrine, therefore, should be limited to ac-
tivities that involve such toxic wastes. Transporting "wet dynamite" should not be
deemed an ultrahazardous activity.
173. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 (1938).
174. See, e.g., Carson v. Blodgett Constr. Co., 189 Mo. App. 120, 126, 174 S.W.
447, 448 (1915) (blasting is a strict liability offense).
175. See, e.g., Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 331-32, 270 P. 952,
955 (1928) (strict liability imposed for damage resulting from oil well blow out).
176. See, e.g., Scalpiro v. Smith, 154 Mo. App. 524, 534-35, 135 S.W. 1000, 1003
(1911) (strict liability for storage of dynamite couched in public nuisance language).
See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520, comment 3 (1938).
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ing of wild animals, 177 flying airplanes, 178 and crop dusting.
179
Similarly, activities involving hazardous waste may result in serious
harm despite precautions. In addition, like victims of exploding dyna-
mite or crashing airplanes, victims of hazardous waste pollution gener-
ally are unable to guard against injury. 180
Missouri case law arguably supports the application of strict liability
principles to hazardous waste activities. Missouri courts have ex-
tended strict liability under nuisance law to cases involving damages
from explosion of stored explosives,181 from blasting operations,
18 2
from flooding,' 83 and from gasoline storage."8 4 These decisions clearly
show support for strict liability principles. 8 5  The extra danger
presented by activities involving hazardous waste justifies placing these
endeavors in a separate strict liability category.18 6 This approach will
ameliorate the property-related bias present in current Missouri envi-
ronmental law.' 87 Additionally, it will avert the overuse of trespass
and nuisance in personal injury actions' and concomitantly provide a
177. See, e.g., Copley v. Wills, 152 S.W. 830, 831 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) (monkeys).
178. See, e.g., United States v. Kesinger, 190 F.2d 529, 532 (10th Cir. 1951) (gov-
ernment liable for damages caused by Army Air Force airplane crash).
179. See, e.g., Chapman Chem. Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630, 643-44, 222 S.W.2d
820, 827 (1949) (chemical manufacturer liable for damages that crop dusting caused to
surrounding property owners).
180. See Note, supra note 151, at 974.
181. See, e.g., Liggett v. Excelsior Powder Mfg. Co., 173 Mo. App. 220, 158 S.W.
723 (1913).
182. See, e.g., Blackford v. Herman Constr. Co., 132 Mo. App. 157, 112 S.W. 287
(1908).
183. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Burlington N., Inc., 514 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. 1974) (en
banc).
184. See, e.g., City of Spickardsville v. Terry, 274 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Mo. Ct. App.
1954).
185. In French v. Center Creek Power Mfg. Co., 173 Mo. App. 220, 158 S.W. 723
(1913), a case involving explosives storage, the court stated:
[T]he storer of [a] dangerous substance must answer for the damages directly flow-
ing and occasioned thereby; [t]his brings into play the principle that, where a
wrong is done and one of two persons must suffer loss, law and natural justice shall
see to it, if possible, that he who made it possible for the damage to be done should
bear the loss.
Id. at 226-27, 158 S.W. at 726.
186. See supra notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
188. One commentator, after analyzing Missouri strict liability law, concluded:
Many times it is not necessary to apply liability without negligence for the factual
situation will often contain the elements of trespass or nuisance. There are other
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clear-cut rule concerning what actions will make a party liable absent
negligence. 89
Other states have developed statutory actions for toxics-induced per-
sonal injuries similar to this approach. Both North Dakota' 90 and
Rhode Island'9 have statutes that reflect a negligence per se approach.
Alaska,1 92 North Carolina, 93 and Minnesota 194 have statutory provi-
times, however, when the courts have felt it desirable to apply strict liability, yet
the true elements of common law trespass or nuisance were not present. This is
when the word "trespass" or "nuisance" is used in a manner which is contrary to
normal historical usage. It would seem ... in these cases then, for the sake of
symmetry, understandability and a fair application of strict liability, a rule such as
set forth in [Rylands] and reiterated in the [RSATEMENT OF TORTS § 520
(1938)] should be recognized.
See Comment, supra note 133, at 60.
189. Id.
190. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-40-11 (1976), which provides a cause of action for
statutory violations. The section provides that a court may grant relief specified in the
environmental statute alleged to have been violated, or pursuant to which the regulation
alleged to have been violated was promulgated, id. § 32-40-11(1), including damages, id.
§ 32-40-11(3).
191. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.1-22 (1984 Supp.). The section provides:
(a) Any person who shall violate the provisions of this chapter through the dispo-
sal of hazardous waste in a manner or location not authorized by this chapter or
the rules and regulations promulgated pursuant hereto, or who shall have caused
such unauthorized disposal of hazardous wastes shall be absolutely liable for the
cost of containment, cleanup, restoration and removal of the hazardous wastes for
all damages, losses or injuries, including environmental, which result directly or
indirectly from such discharge.
Id. § 23-19.1-22(a).
192. See ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.822 (1982). This section provides:
To the extent not otherwise preempted by federal law, a person owning or having
control over a hazardous substance which enters in or upon the waters, surface or
subsurface lands of the state is strictly liable, without regard to fault, for the dam-
ages to persons or property, public or private, caused by entry.
Id.
193. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143.215.83 (1983). This section provides:
Unlawful Discharges.-It shall be unlawful . . . for any person to discharge, or
cause to be discharged oil or other hazardous substances into or upon any waters,
tidal flats, beaches or lands within this state, or into any sewer, surface water drain
or other waters that drain into the waters of this State, regardless of fault of the
person having control over the oil or hazardous substances, or regardless of acci-
dent or other cause.
Id.
194. See MINN. STAT. § 115B.05, subd. 1 (1983). This section provides:
Except as otherwise provided in subdivisions 2 to 10, and notwithstanding any
other provision or rule of law, any person who is responsible for the release of a
hazardous substance from a facility is strictly liable, jointly and severally, for the
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sions that impose strict liability for varying types of hazardous waste
induced injury. Finally, in California, proven victims of toxic torts
that are unable to find the party responsible for the harm can obtain
administrative compensation for their personal injuries.195 Provisions
such as these reflect the states' growing concern regarding the extreme
dangers posed by hazardous wastes.
The Missouri General Assembly should follow the example provided
by these states. Activities involving hazardous wastes are properly
termed "ultrahazardous activities." As a result, the legislature should
excuse victims from proving the defendant's negligence in hazardous
waste cases.
196
following damages which result from the release or to which the release signifi-
cantly contributes:
(a) All damages for actual economic loss including:
(1) Any injury to, destruction of, or loss of any real or personal property,
including relocation costs;
(2) Any loss of real or personal property;
(3) Any loss of past or future income or profits resulting from injury to,
destruction of, or loss of real or personal property, without regard to
the ownership of the property; and
(b) All damages for death, personal injury, or disease including:
(1) Any medical expenses, rehabilitation costs or burial expenses;
(2) Any loss of past or future income, or loss of earning capacity; and
(3) Damages for pain and suffering, including physical impairment.
Id.
195. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25372 (Deering 1981). Victims that
cannot find a solvent party from whom to collect also are eligible for administrative
compensation. Id. Injury compensation under this scheme is restricted to full, unin-
sured medical expenses and 80% of all uninsured loss of income (up to $15,000 per year
for three years) proximately caused by injury to the victim's property or person. Id.
§ 25375.
196. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 521 (1938) exempts from the ultrahazardous doc-
trine's reach, activity that involves a public duty or is undertaken by a common carrier.
Some jurisdictions reject this exception. See Comment, Common Carriers and Risk Dis-
tribution: Absolute Liability for Transporting Hazardous Materials, 67 KY. L.J. 441,
442-43 (1978-79). Missouri courts apply the "public duty" doctrine, but it now appears
to be in jeopardy of being overturned. See Pecan Shoppe of Springfield Mo., Inc. v. Tri-
State Motor Transit Co., 573 S.W.2d 432 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). In Pecan Shoppe, the
court refused to apply strict liability to a motor carrier engaged in transporting explo-
sives for damage caused when a striking employee of the carrier fired shots into a truck
carrying explosives, causing an explosion. The court also ruled as it did because an
intentional act of a third party had caused the harm. Id. at 437. The court seemingly
rejected the "public duty" doctrine. See id. at 437-38.
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3. Use of Presumptions, Expanded Evidentiary Rules, and
Apportionment Principles
As discussed above, proving causation is the major obstacle to recov-
ery for toxics induced harm.' 97 Even under a strict liability theory
plaintiffs must sustain this burden of proof. The Model Statute em-
ploys evidentiary presumptions19 and expands evidentiary rules to
ease this burden.
Presumptions allow a party to shift the burden of production or
proof after establishing certain basic facts.' 99 Typically, in hazardous
waste statutes these basic facts concern the characteristics of the chem-
ical, the circumstances of exposure, and the harm alleged.2°° If the
presumption is rebuttable, the defendant must meet the shifted burden
of producing evidence 20' or must convince the jury that the "basic
facts" initially proven are false, 20 2 depending on whether the presump-
tion shifts the burden of production or persuasion. The party that es-
tablishes the basic facts wins if the defendant is unable to sustain the
applicable burden. If the presumption is irrebuttable, the defendant
loses once the plaintiff makes a showing of the basic facts.20 3
The establishment of the basic facts that create the presumption
must lead to a high probability that the reflecting presumption is cor-
rect. 2M Although irrebuttable presumptions appear in laws protecting
197. See supra notes 73-92 and accompanying text.
198. For a discussion of the benefits and difficulties involved in the use of presump-
tions to simplify the problems of proof facing victims of occupational disease, see gener-
ally Note, Compensating Victims of Occupational Disease, 93 HARv. L. Rav. 916
(1980).
199. See Trauberman, supra note 10, at 227.
200. Id. Pennsylvania's solid waste management statute establishes a rebuttable
presumption of causation for harm that occurs "within 2,500 feet of the perimeter of the
area where the hazardous waste activities have been carried out." PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
35, § 6018.611 (Purdon Supp. 1982).
201. Under this approach, the party invoking the presumption still bears the ulti-
mate burden of convincing the jury that the presumed fact is true. See Trauberman,
supra note 10, at 227 n.308.
202. In this case, the opponent bears the burden of establishing that the nonexis-
tence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence. Id. at 228 n.309.
203. Id. at 227.
204. See INJURIES AND DAMAGES I, supra note 25, at 300 (remarks of Charles D.
Breitel, Superfund Study Group Member). Mr. Breitel disagreed with the notion that
the more difficult it is to prove causation, the stronger the presumption. He stated:
"This can lead to the reductio ad absurdum that if causation is not provable at all, then
there must be a claim saving presumption." Id. at 299-300.
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the public health and the environment,2"5 the Model Statute adopts a
rebuttable presumption because its operation can better take into ac-
count the exigencies of the particular case at hand.2 °6 Missouri law
does not currently offer toxics victims the benefit of a legal
presumption.
Under the Model Statute a claimant has two possible defendants:20 7
a personal injury compensation fund208 and a private party defend-
ant.209 The plaintiff's choice of defendants determines whether a pre-
sumption may be invoked. In claims against the Fund, a rebuttable
presumption that shifts the burden of persuasion is available.210 The
plaintiff triggers this presumption by proving the presence of a covered
injury,21 exposure to a certain chemical, and the likelihood that the
exposure was a substantial factor in causing the injury.21 2 The Fund
can rebut the presumption by showing that the exposure was not a
substantial factor in causing the illness or that the plaintiff "assumed
the risk" of the resulting harm.2 13
In contrast, if the plaintiff brings a claim against a private party, no
presumption is available. A plaintiff must prove that a private defend-
ant's actions were a "substantial factor" in causing the covered in-
jury.2 4 The Model Statute allows these plaintiffs to use expanded
evidentiary rules215 and liberal rules addressing the problem of appor-
205. See Black Lung Benefits Reform Act, 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(3) (1982).
206. See Trauberman, supra note 10, at 227. Irrebuttable presumptions are rare
because they provide the court with little room for discretion and lead to many errone-
ous decisions. Id. at 227 n.303.
207. The Model Statute allows a claimant to proceed against the liability fund or
against the private party allegedly responsible for the harm under the Model Statute or
state law. Trauberman, supra note 10, at 263.
208. See id. § 205(a), at 263.
209. Id. § 201, at 258.
210. See id. § 205(d), at 263. Becausejuries are not used in proceedings against the
Fund, shifting the burden of production would have little or no effect on the outcome of
the case. See Trauberman, supra note 10, at 228.
211. Id. § 205(c), at 263.
212. Id. § 205(d), at 264. If the defendant fails to rebut the plaintiff's initial causal
showing, the plaintiff prevails. Id.
213. Id. § 202(b), at 259.
214. Id. § 201, at 258.
215. Id. § 204, at 262-63. The Model Statute's treatment of relevant evidence con-
stitutes a departure from Missouri evidence law, which follows the Frye rule. See supra
notes 83-88 and accompanying text. The statute is mindful, however, of the rationale
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tioning harm and damages among multiple causes.2 16
These alternative causes of action in the Model Statute reflect differ-
ent magnitudes and likelihoods of recovery. Against the Fund, a plain-
tiff can recover only pecuniary losses, 2 17 while in a claim against a
private defendant, the plaintiff can recover for "pain and suffering."
218
Therefore, recovery under the Fund normally will be smaller. Using a
presumption when recovering against the Fund is equitable. The
Fund, in effect, spreads the recovery costs among all of its contributors.
These parties can absorb the cost and are responsible collectively for
the risk that caused the harm. Alternatively, use of presumptions
against individual defendants, especially when multiple parties are in-
volved, could unfairly result in an entire claim being levied against a
few innocent defendants.
Use of the strict liability theory, presumptions, expanded evidentiary
rules, and liberalized apportionment principles substantially lighten a
behind the Frye rule, and specifically excludes evidence that would "inflame the trier of
fact." The following evidence, however, is deemed admissible:
(1) Epidemological data; (2) results of animal or human laboratory or toxicologi-
cal studies; (3) test data on microorganisms and tissue samples; (4) information on
the correlations between the structure of chemical substances or mixtures and their
potential to cause or contribute to a covered disease in an individual; and (5) stud-
ies of the effects of exposure to two or more covered disease substances or mixtures.
Trauberman, supra note 10, § 204, at 262-63.
216. The problem of apportioning harm is the primary focus of the Model Statute in
the case of private lawsuits, because it is extremely burdensome for victims of toxic
waste pollution to establish the contribution of each of several multiple independent
causes to their injuries. The Model Statute provides that any party whose actions are
proven to be a substantial factor in causing the harm may be held liable for the "full
extent" of the plaintiffs damages. See Trauberman, supra note 10, § 201, at 258. The
defendant can limit its liability thereafter by establishing the existence of other contrib-
uting causes. Id. § 202(a), at 258-59. When the court determines that responsibility for
the plaintiff's injuries cannot be determined, however, the statute allows each defendant
to be held liable only for the "proportionate share of the risks such defendant caused to
the harmed plaintiff, based upon the contribution of all persons in the risk-creating
group." Id. § 202b, at 260. See also Note, Unearthing Defendants in Toxic Waste Liti-
gation: Problems of Liability and Identification, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 891, 898-905
(1982) (discussing apportionment of liability in toxic cases). Cf. Sindell v. Abbott Labo-
ratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 610-13, 607 P.2d 924, 936-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144-46
("market share" liability in which each defendant liable for its share of defective prod-
uct's market), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
217. Trauberman, supra note 10, § 206, at 265.
218. Id. § 201, at 258. The Model Statute's author points out that if a presumption
were used against private defendants when non-pecuniary damages were available, this
would "completely alter the common law principles governing damage awards." See id.
at 229.
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plaintiff's heavy burden of proving causation. These proposed rules
will make litigation more viable and less costly for the injured plaintiff.
These rules also shift the expense of hazardous waste pollution onto the
responsible parties that profit at the cost of the resulting harm. Gener-
ally, these parties are in the best position to insure against the harm,
and to spread these costs among society. 219 Additionally, this new the-
ory of liability will be an incentive for parties to engage in safer proce-
dures, and thus, behave more responsibly. Also, the new theory of
liability will encourage parties involved in the transportation, genera-
tion, and disposal of hazardous waste to develop new technology that
eliminates the hazardous waste problem.22 °
4. The Liability Fund
The Missouri Hazardous Waste Management Law fund provides
compensation for property damage only. The Missouri Legislature,
like Congress, lets the common law resolve toxic tort personal injury
claims.221
A personal injury compensation fund has two purposes: 1) to com-
219. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461-468, 150 P.2d 436,
441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). The imposition of strict liability furthers the pol-
icy of spreading the costs of injury to the manufacturers that can insure against risk or
pass the higher costs on to their customers. Id. Escola was a products liability case.
For a useful application of products liability theory to hazardous waste pollution, see
Note, supra note 151, at 977-85.
220. Justice Traynor also stated that forcing even non-negligent manufacturers to
take steps to prevent future harm was one of the policies of strict liability. Justice Tray-
nor's other two policies included fixing responsibility on the party that introduced the
risk and that is most likely to have evidence to evaluate the product's safety, and placing
responsibility on those that induce reliance on their reputations. Note, supra note 151,
at 977-85.
221. This judgment is consistent with the "property-related bias," which hinders
recovery for hazardous waste-induced injury at common law. See supra notes 56-62
and accompanying text. Regarding the United States Senate's decision to apply federal
"Superfund" money only to property related damage, Senator George Mitchell stated:
"In the bill, we are telling the people of this country that under our value system a
property interest is worth compensating but a human life is not." 126 CONG. REC.
S30,941 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Mitchell).
California recently enacted the Hazardous Substances Account Act, which addresses
the victim's compensation problem. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25300-611
(Deering Supp. 1984). The Act provides for administrative compensation for proven
toxics victims that are unable to identify the source of polluting activity or the party
responsible for it. Id. § 25372(a). Victims that are unable to find a solvent party from
whom to collect are eligible for administrative compensation as well. Id. § 25372(b).
Compensation for personal injuries under this scheme is restricted to full, uninsured
medical expenses and 80% of all uninsured loss of income (up to $15,000 per year for
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pensate victims of hazardous waste pollution when recovery is other-
wise impossible;222 and 2) to impose collective responsibility on fund
contributors by requiring them to make payments in proportion to the
risk of harm they create.223 As provided in the Missouri Hazardous
Waste Management Law, the new fund should be subrogated to the
rights of claimants that choose to recover from it.224 This guards
against the Fund's depletion.
Establishing and structuring a personal injury compensation fund in-
volves a policy choice within the special competence of the legislature.
In establishing a fund, the following issues arise:
a) Which activities should trigger contribution to the fund?
b) How much should each entity contribute?
c) How large should be the total amount of the fund?2
2 5
a. Activities That Should Trigger Contribution
The current Missouri Hazardous Waste Remedial Fund is capital-
ized by fees and taxes levied on hazardous waste generators, transport-
ers, and disposers. The Personal Injury Compensation Fund should
follow this structure. Legislators, of course, must structure this fund to
avoid federal Superfund preemption.22 6
three years), proximately caused by injury to the victim's property or person. Id.
§ 25375(a)-(b).
222. See Trauberman, supra note 10, at 237.
223. Id.
224. As a practical matter, this guards against depleting the Fund. In addition,
however, subrogation distinguishes funds from insurance plans, which provide little in-
centive to be careful. Knowing that the fund is subrogated to the victim's claims pro-
vides the Fund's contributors with an incentive to act carefully.
225. See Milhollin, supra note 3, at 16.
226. The federal Superfund law does not preempt states from creating additional
funds and its coinciding liability provisions. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9614(a)-
9614(c) (1982). The Act, however, expressly prohibits double recovery, id. § 9614(b),
and provides that "no person may be required to contribute to any fund, the purpose of
which is to pay compensation for claims for costs of response or damages or claims
which may be compensated [under the federal Superfund Act]." Id. § 9614(c).
One purpose of the state fund proposed in this Note is to compensate all provable
hazardous waste-induced personal injury. The Superfund's Post-Closure Liability Trust
Fund has a similar, albeit more narrow purpose. See supra note 32. Thus, the Missouri
Legislature, to avoid preemption, must ensure that the new state fund works in conjunc-
tion with, rather than in conflict to, the federal post-closure funding provision.
See also Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 190 N.J. Super. 131, 134-39, 462 A.2d 193, 195-97
(App. Div.) (Matthews, J., concurring) (under CERCLA, state can tax local industries
to support fund dedicated to purpose of compensating claims and costs not actually
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The range of activities that subject an entity to participating in the
victim's compensation fund, however, should be more narrow than
those of the Remedial Fund scheme. For instance, the legislature
could impose a fee on those that engage in "toxics-related activity that
poses a great danger to human health., 227 Legislators could define this
activity according to its nature or the type of hazardous substance in-
volved.228 In addition, such a statutory scheme could further divide
such risky activity into "long-term" and "short-term" categories 229 to
encourage planning and early remedial action.
b. The Amount of Contribution
The degree of known risk that the activity poses230 should determine
the amount of contribution.23 The Missouri Hazardous Waste Com-
mission is competent to make this determination,232 based on informa-
tion available to it under the Hazardous Waste Management Law's
information reporting provisions.
c. The Amount of the Fund
By considering the risk of harm that toxic waste pollution produces,
the solvency of the industries responsible for the problem, and the ad-
ministrative costs involved in collecting fees for the fund, the General
Assembly can determine an adequate amount for the personal injury
compensation fund.233
paid for by superfund), affid, 97 N.J. 526, 481 A.2d 271 (1984). Spill Compensation
and Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10 23.11(g) (West 1982).
227. A Florida statute concerning oil spills focuses on hazards that present future
"threats of potentially catastrophic proportions .... " FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.021
(West 1974).
228. Texas has classified numerous wastes into categories according to the risk they
pose. Substances such as Aldrin, asbestos, DDT, mercury, and PCBs have been classi-
fied as hazardous under published formulas and testing criteria. Texas Water Quality
Board, Technical Guidelines No. 1, Attachment A (May 3, 1976).
229. See Milhollin, supra note 3, at 18-19.
230. Id.
231. Generally, a tax or fee levied for a hazardous waste fund consists of a certain
monetary amount per ton. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.441(3) (West Supp. 1979).
Missouri's Fund, however, is funded by an employee "head tax," which is a tax of two
dollars per covered employee of generators of hazardous waste in Missouri. Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 260.478 (Vernon Supp. 1984). Generators now are challenging the constitu-
tionality of this provision in court. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 6, 1984, at 13A, col. 2.
232. See supra notes 148, 150 and accompanying text.
233. Milhollin, supra note 3, at 24.
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d. The Benefits of a Personal Injury Compensation Fund
Liability funds can substantially remove many of the barriers that
block recovery at common law. A state-administered fund can outlive
any individual or corporate defendant. 34 A claimant can hold a fund
strictly liable and benefit from favorable evidentiary presumptions.
These features can permit relatively quick administrative relief to
claimants that have small claims or are unable to locate the responsible
party. Finally, by helping apportion costs among parties responsible
for injuries, a liability fund can aid the legal system in encouraging safe
conduct by those engaged in hazardous waste generation, transporta-
tion, and disposal.
VI. CONCLUSION
In terms of personal injury and hardship, the true extent of Mis-
souri's hazardous waste problem will become more apparent ten to
twenty years from now. In the meantime, manifestations of latent
harm caused by toxics exposure will become more common. Persons
that suffer harm will find little possibility of compensation in current
Missouri common law remedies. Traversing the treacherous path to
private recovery requires avoiding a statute of limitations bar, finding a
responsible defendant, proving causation, and satisfying the sometimes
anachronous requirements of the common law theories available. Pri-
vate recovery in tort for latent toxics harm resembles a lottery more
than a system that makes the victim's compensation its objective.
Regrettably, the Missouri General Assembly has failed to respond to
the state toxics problem by providing an adequate statutory cause of
action. It is now essential that the legislature act, for such a cause of
action is necessary to provide fair compensation for victims of a grow-
ing problem and to ensure the long-term health of Missouri citizens.
234. Id. at 16. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
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